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RACE, "THE RACE," AND THE REPUBLIC: RECONCEIVING JUDICIAL AUTHORITY AFTER
BUSH V. GORE
Larry Catd Backer'

INTRODUCTION

La vendetta, oh, la vendetta,

un piacer serbato ai soggi,
l'obliar l'onte, gli oltraggi
6 bassezza, 6 ognor vilt .

Coll'astuzia... Coll'arguzia,
coil' giudizio, col criterio...
Si protebbe ...il fatto serio

ma credete si farA.
Se tutto il codice dovessi volgere,

se tutto 1'indice dovessi leggere,
con un equivoco, con un sinonimo,

qualque garbuglio si troverA.
Tutto Siviglia conosce Bartolo,
il birbo Figaro vinto sarA.'
+ Professor of Law Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law. Earlier
versions of this paper were presented at the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania
Political Science Association, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, April 6, 2001, and the Sixth
Annual LatCrit Conference, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, April 27, 2001.
My thanks to Chris Kellett, Bob Ackerman, Jay Mootz, Francisco Valdes, and Rob Gatter
for comments on earlier versions of this essay.
1.
Vengeance, oh vengeance
Is a pleasure meant for the wise;
to forgo insults and outrage,
is base and utterly repugnant.
With astuteness... With cleverness
With discretion, with judgment
if possible... Its attainment is important;
but believe me, it will be done.
If I have to pore over all the law books,
If I have to read all the case notes,
with equivocation, with analogy,
some sort of impediment can be found.
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The most serious threats to the stable organization of a republic
usually do not arise from foreseeable dangers because the institutions of
a republic are well crafted to guard against these dangers. The nation
deployed its great resources to guard against an assault to the integrity of
the national electoral process in the wake of the contested election of
November 2002. The result, the Supreme Court's decision in Bush v.
Gore,' settled the election. Much has been written about that great
deployment of resources and the reforms that, as a result, may come to
pass.3 It is not my intention to add to that study or to comment on the
central criticisms of the Supreme Court's actions in Bush v. Gore.
Instead, my focus is on the great, yet indirect and less visible,
consequences of the deployment of resources that led, with a minimum
of conflict, to the installation of a national leader in 2001. That
deployment of resources in the courts has opened a space in which other
battles over the nature and character of our political system might be
fought, away from the glare of any public spotlight. This article will
examine the profound and unintended consequences of the 2000
presidential election on the nature of judicial authority and the relation
between judicial authority and the authority of the legislative branch.
These consequences, and their potential future effect, remind us that the
fundamental character of a republic is not necessarily transformed
through any great act of treachery or revolutionary conflict, or even
through any great public debate. Rather, the political character of a
All Sevilla knows Bartolo,
that villain Figaro will be defeated.
Lorenzo da Ponte, Le Nozze di Figaro, Act 1. No. 4 Aria (Bartolo), music by Wolgang
Amadeus Mozart (1786). In this well-known aria, Don Bartolo explains the necessity of
vengeance, as well as the utility of statutory and judicial manipulation in furtherance of its
design. The object of vengeance in this case is Figaro, who is to marry Suzanna. The
character of the vengeance is symmetrical. Just as Figaro thwarted Don Bartolo's
marriage to Rosina in favor of a rival, now Bartolo will do to Figaro what Figaro had
earlier done to him. That symmetry of revenge finds significant echo throughout the
article that follows. In the opera, Don Bartolo's revenge leads to a series of unintended
but important consequences. The unintended consequences of revenge are at the heart of
this article as well.
2.
531 U.S. 1046 (2001).
3.
For a defense of the institutional response to the contested election, see, e.g.,
RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS (2001). For a different perspective, see, e.g., Mark
Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90 GEO. L.J.
113 (2001). See also George L. Priest, Reanalyzing Bush v. Gore: Democratic
Accountability and Judicial Overreaching, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 953 (2001); Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., An Epitaphios for Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law: Bush v.
Gore and the EmergingJurisprudenceof Oprah!,90 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 n.3 (2002) (citing
to much of the emerging literature).
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republic can be transformed through constant small attacks, each
formally invoking republican process, yet each distorting that process in
the service of factional or personal advantage. Taken together, these
successive manipulations at the margin, these uses of precedent or
tradition in exaggerated form and extreme ends, eventually reconstruct
any republic into something quite unlike itself.
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. recently described the emerging
conventional consensus on the Bush decisions:
A conventional understanding of the Bush v. Gore case goes
something like this: The evil Supreme Court majority, bent on
securing conservative appointees to the federal judiciary,
engaged in blatant results-oriented reasoning to rule in favor of
Governor Bush. Along the way, members of the evil majority
abandoned all prior principles regarding respect for state courts
and judicial restraint.
The decision, accordingly, lacks
legitimacy.4
Krotoszynski rejected this conventional characterization and invoked
ancient Athens to provide a classical form for his lament over the passing
of stare decisis and the philosophy of judging it represented.' I also
reject this conventional characterization of the Bush decisions, but for
very different reasons. An unconventional understanding of the Bush
decisions starts by accepting the legitimacy of the decisions and then
seeks the reasons for and consequences of that legitimacy. According to
this perspective, the decisions are legitimate because they derive from a
legitimating institution. The consequences of that decision then become
more interesting and more potentially far reaching - both for the
institution and the political system it serves.6 In the context of the Bush
4.
Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 2089. Bruce Ackerman, a well-known academic
figure, described the decision as a "constitutional coup." Bruce Ackerman, Anatomy of a
Constitutional Coup, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 8, 2001, at 3, available at
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v23/n03/print/acke0l_.html.
5.
Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 2092-93.
I would like to invoke a tradition of ancient Athens. In ancient Athens, custom
dictated that the death of a hero in battle required a formal funeral oratory, or
epitaphios .... The metaphor to ancient Athens may seem bizarre. But, although
I do not profess to be a modem Pericles, I believe the principle of stare decisis in
modern constitutional adjudication, like a fallen hero, merits a decent burial....
Bush v. Gore was not - and is not - a break with the Supreme Court's modus
operandi, but rather constitutes a foreseeable consequence of problematic trends
that have been present for several decades.
Id.
6.
I start therefore from a substantially different place than much conventional
analysis, which tends to weigh the legitimacy and the importance of the Bush decisions in
terms of their outcome or their popular support. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, Bush v. Gore
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v. Gore decisions, invoking the principles and history of the Roman
Republic, rather than the forms of the Athenian democracy, provides a
far more useful basis for understanding the Bush decisions.
The history of the Roman Republic reminds us that any constitution,
even that of a venerable republic, can be transformed without the benefit
of an amendment. Such a transformation may so reshape a republic that
it begins to function as a monarchy in everything but name. But the
political transformation of a polity can be masked. The most easily
fashioned mask consists of the forms of the superceded political systems.
Totalitarian dictatorships can masquerade as democracies by maintaining
democratic institutions, such as legislatures and judiciaries, which are
under the control of the ruling group. The early Roman Empire retained
the institutional forms of the Republic even as power was transferred to
the imperial household.7
Republican Rome also serves as an example of the limited utility of
invocation of tradition. The Roman Republic was organized as a classand-clan-based representative polity in which the forms of political
organization were grounded in a tradition that permitted flexibility.
The Romans venerated tradition, but it was always evolving; it
could actually be contended that change was characteristic of it.
When Pompey's opponents in 66 argued that the conferment of
a great command on him would be an innovation contrary to
ancestral practices, Cicero could reply that it was traditional to
adopt new expedient as to meet new emergencies. Hence what
was constitutional could be a matter of great controversy. The
most recent practice could be challenged by resurrecting ancient
precedents, and vice versa. This kind of uncertainty no doubt
made it easier for Augustus to represent his own innovations as
a modification rather the subversion of the old order.
The system was, moreover, finely balanced: the rights of people,
magistrates, and senate, if pressed to the utmost, would lead to

Through the Lens of ConstitutionalHistory, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1721 (2001). The importance
of the case is not necessarily a function of its popularity or its value as doctrine specifically
applicable to elections. Instead, its value, like many of the race cases of the 1960s and 70s,
derives from the jurisprudential tools it sharpens for use by later courts in very different
settings. See infra Part V.
7.
ALAN WATSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ARCHAIC ROME: WAR AND
RELIGION 54 (1993).
"Human beings tend not to be overly inventive: ideas and

procedures that have outlived their setting in life continue in being.... The system might
be unsuitable and subject to great strain, might eventually even break down, without
disappearing altogether." Id.
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breakdown; and the balance depended on some de ree of social
harmony, which was dissipated in the late Republic.
The Roman Republic illustrates a pattern that has been experienced
by other republics in danger of internal breakdown.9 The American
Republic, like its Roman predecessor, presents a finely balanced
system.0 Each of the major actors in this system, including the people,
the nation, and the component parts thereof - governmental and nongovernmental groups - seeks to gain advantages at the expense of the
others in the context of their limited and overlapping authority. Like the
late Roman Republic, the American Republic has seen a dissipation of
social harmony."1
P.A. BRUNT, THE FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 13 (1988).
See, e.g., Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalizationof Racism in a Constitutional
9.
State: Democracy's Suicide in Vichy France,50 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1998).
8.

10.

See, e.g., JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE

MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996). The checks and balances with which we are
familiar extend beyond the interior organization of the federal government. It extends to
almost every aspect of our social and political organization. See generally SUSAN DUNN,
SISTER REVOLUTIONS: FRENCH LIGHTNING, AMERICAN LIGHT (2000) (discussing the

basis of the construction and the mechanics of our republic in comparative perspective).
There was general consensus during the period of the early republic about the utility of
this form of political organization. This consensus was based on a fundamental distrust of
the motives of individuals or groups. For example, the famous excerpt from Madison's
Federalist No. 51 states:
It is of great importance in a Republic not only to guard the society against the
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of society against the injustice of
the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens.
If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be
insecure. There are but two methods of providing against this evil; the one by
creating a will in the community itself; the other, by comprehending in the
society so many separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust
combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not impracticable.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987). This finds
its echo in the work of John C. Calhoun. See, e.g., John C. Calhoun, A Disquisition on
Government, in JOHN C. CALHOUN, UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 7-12 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992). For Calhoun, a "constitution
stands to government, as government stands to society; and as the end for which society is
ordained, would be defeated without government, so that for which government is
ordained would... be defeated without constitution." Id. at 9. A good constitution "will
furnish the ruled with the means of resisting successfully this tendency on the part of the
rulers to oppression and abuse." Id. at 12. "Power can only be resisted by power -- and
The same constitution of our nature which leads rulers to
tendency by tendency ....
oppress the ruled ... will, with equal strength, lead the ruled to resist, when possessed of
the means of making peaceable and effective resistance." Id. at 13.
Even a cursory review of the legal literature on this topic brings this point home.
11.
See, e.g., GEORGE GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE (1992); CHARLES MURRAY AND
THE BELL CURVE (1994); REPUBLICAN NATIONAL
RICHARD HERRENSTEIN,
COMMITTEE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH,
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The recent litigation of the 2000 Presidential election, which arose
from the disputed result of votes cast in the state of Florida, represents
one of the most significant uses of traditional forms of governance in
exaggerated form and for extreme ends. In particular, the decisions of
the Florida Supreme Court concerning the counting and certification of
the votes cast in the Presidential election 2 and the remand, stay, and
review of those decisions by the United States Supreme Court merit
special attention. These decisions, especially those of the U.S. Supreme
Court, pandered to the formally innocuous but substantially subversive
positions of the litigants and laid the foundation for significant distorting
of the foundations of the Republic.
This article has two goals. The first is to describe the ways in which
this litigation, primarily the opinions of the federal Supreme Court in
Bush v. Gore,3 stretches and bends the foundational norms of the
Republic. The second is to suggest the ways in which the litigation might
contribute to fundamental changes in the operation of the Republic in
many circumstances far removed from the ostensibly narrow context in
which the original litigation arose. These effects are not limited to the
facts of this case, and its teachings involve more than federal election
law. 4 Indeed, the institutional effects of this decision build on and

REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (1994);
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 19-49 (1990); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE:
A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY AND NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID:
SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE

UNDERCLASS

(1993).

12.
Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000), cert. granted and stay granted Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) and rev'd Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)(Bush II); Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000) vacated by Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000)(Bush 1) opinion on remand Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000). Bush I1 is
particularly interesting because, though it is written in the form of a per curium opinion,
with a concurrence and a number of dissents, it is clear that the per curium opinion was
designed as political window dressing - the bland face of a neutral court understating its
opinion. The real battle lines are illuminated in both the concurrence and the dissents,
with the latter treating the concurrence as a majority opinion.
13. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 70, 98 (2000). My focus will not be on the specifics of
election law, its weaknesses, or its need for reform. Moreover, my focus is not on the
nature of the outcome of the election itself. This article is not about election stealing
either by Mr. Gore or Mr. Bush. It is not about the denial of the ballot to certain groups
of people because of their race, religion, or anticipated political leanings.
14. See infra Part IV.
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during
consolidate institutional adjustments that occurred in this country
15
century.
twentieth
the
of
battles
race
great
the
of
the course
The stretching and bending takes these forms. Each opinion seems
innocuous, harking formally to past precedent. Yet, the substance of
each opinion contains the possibility of substantial innovation. First, the
new-found emphasis on interpretation, as opposed to legislation
regarding the judicial approach to dispute resolution substantially limits
the ways that courts have wielded power. Second, the expansive view of
the federal judicial power to intervene has cleared the path for drastic
16
alteration of the distribution of power between state and federal courts.
Third, the use of the federal Constitution as a direct limitation on the
distribution of power within state government turns the constitutional
have no power other
system on its head, effectively presuming that states
17
than that found within the federal Constitution.
These three broad forms of norm elasticity suggest the possibility of
major changes. First, the litigation takes an indirect step toward subtly
repudiating the judicial philosophy of Marbury v. Madison.'8 By
suggesting that there are valid (interpretation) and invalid (law-making)
forms of judicial review of legislation, the federal Supreme Court has
provided a principled basis for repudiating the understanding that it is for
the courts to say what the law is. When courts "go too far," Bush v. Gore
provides justification for another branch to confine the court to its
judicial province. Bush v. Gore thus limits the form of judicial
constitutional review. By the same token, Bush v. Gore also provides a
principled basis for limiting the power of courts to craft new forms of
remedies. In essence, the decision provides the basis for a doctrine of
legislative supremacy unknown in the Republic since its earliest days.
Second, the case serves as evidence of the further consolidation of the
federal and state systems. After Bush v. Gore, it is possible to see a
future where state supreme courts will constitute another system of
appellate courts with "special" jurisdiction. Bush v. Gore suggests that
all issues may contain within federal questions, if only negatively. Like
15. See infra Part V.
16. It seems that, even within their own competence, state courts remain inferior to
the Supreme Court in ways that have become clearer after Bush H. In many respects, this
mimics the attempt by the European Court of Justice to expand the extent of its own
authority over matters indirectly touching on those matters at the heart of its competence.
See, e.g., Case C-107/94, Asscher v. Staatssecretaris van Financian, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3089,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 61 (1996), and discussion infra note 72.
17. In this, perhaps, we reap in full measure the possibilities inherent in the post-Civil
War Amendments to the federal Constitution.
18. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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the doctrine of the negative Commerce Clause, the new doctrine of
negative federal questions significantly enlarges federal power at the
expense of the states.
Third, the decision furthers the transformation of American
federalism. No longer a system in which governmental power rises up
through the states, American federalism has become a system where
governmental power is vested in states only at the sufferance of the
national government and particularly its courts.
Here is a stark manifestation of the principle of supremacy.
Hierarchy, in this sense, amounts to hegemony. Indeed, one of
the greatest fruits of the American Civil War was the
establishment of a hegemonic notion of supremacy in the
general government ....
It is within the institutions of federal
government that the scope of devolution to the states, or
comity, is most effectively debated and decided.' 9
The stage continues to be prepared for political transformation.
Though little has happened in the short time since the decision, the
possibilities for structural change within the Republic, which were
created by the Warren Court's race decisions, continue to be refined by
the Rehnquist Court. Because the outward form of the Republic appears
none the worse for wear, the media and intellectual elites congratulate
themselves and the polity on a job well done. Many share the view that
the Republic has emerged intact, unchanged, and even stronger from this
near brush with crisis."' The current crop of fungible combatants
embrace, and discussion thereafter appears limited to electoral effects. 21
19. Larry Cat6 Backer, The Extra-National State: American Confederate Federalism
and the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173, 181 n.33 (2001).
20. For example, a nationally broadcast program included a law professor who
asserted that "a constitutional crisis would be a question where no one knew who was
president. And we have every scenario in theory being worked out." One on One with
John McLaughlin including guests: William Lash, Professor, George Mason Law School
and Christine Kellett, Professor, Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law,
Subject: Florida Presidential Vote Count, Taped: Friday, December 1, 2000 (television
broadcast, Dec. 2-3, 2000), transcript available on LEXIS/NEXIS, News Lib (William
Lash, Professor, George Mason Law School speaking). But see John Podhoretz, The Mess
Al Left; Republicans Should Not Rejoice in This Victory, N.Y. POST, Dec. 13, 2000, at 55.
If [Gore] wants to see his monument, he need only look around. Gore leaves in
his wake a prospectively crippled presidency, a judiciary in Florida and in
Washington tainted by a too-close involvement in electoral politics, a nation
already contemptuous of politics now sure to be even more so, and untold tens of
millions of Americans in both parties consumed with a blind rage at what they
see to be the thieving tactics of the other side.
Id.
21.
For example:
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But the intact shell of the Republic masks progress in the consolidation
of significant changes to the national political character.2 I harbor no
illusions that this turning will be reversed. The political tide favors
eventual expansion of the doctrines, the seeds of which find more
generalized expression now. Indeed, I suspect that many welcome the
"clarifications" brought about by the recent litigation. The possibilities
for stability and advantage are hard to resist. In any case, this litigation
both solidifies the facade and brings the nation closer to realizing the
fundamental changes occurring underneath the surface of our political
organization. 23
President-elect George W. Bush wrapped up his two-day goodwill mission to
Washington on Tuesday, meeting with President Clinton and Vice President Al
Gore, the man he defeated in a bitter prolonged battle for the White House. In
their first appearance together since the final presidential debate in St. Louis on
Oct. 17, Democrat Gore greeted the Republican president-elect outside the vicepresident's residence at the U.S. Naval Observatory. They shook hands and
posed for pictures. Gore gave Bush a pat on the back.
Larry Bivins, Bush Meets Clinton, Gore as Washington Visit Winds Down, CHI. SUNTIMES, Dec. 20,2000, at 1.
22. As one historian of Roman history has noted:
Historians have seen the battle of Actium as a watershed - the end of the
republic and the beginning of the principate. It is doubtful whether most
Romans would have been aware of this great milestone, as Octavian, his faction
and patronage represented massive demonstration of continuity. Because of this,
it was easy for such slogans as the restored republic (respublica restituta) to slip
into the political vocabulary.
DAVID SHOTrER, THE FALL OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 96 (1994). Americans have also
adopted the habit of looking for singular great events to mark great transformations. See,
e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991).
23. Of course, this is neither the first nor the last great transformation of the
Republic. The nineteenth century saw a half-century-long struggle to change the internal
political organization of the American Republic, starting with the Civil War and
culminating in the adoption of progressive era constitutional amendments immediately
prior to the start of the First World War. "An amendment of the Constitution in 1913
[Seventeenth Amendment] completed the process formally by making the election of
senators a matter for the people of the states, not for the legislatures .. " K. C. WHEARE,
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3 (1947). Moreover, Wheare, like others, have noted that "in
the United States three amendments XIV, XVI and XVII increased the powers of the
general government." Id. at 237. These changes saw their mature expression during the
half century between the start of the Great Depression and the election of Ronald Reagan
to the American Presidency. The seeds of the next great changes to the internal
governance of our Republic may well have originated with opposition to the Franklin
Roosevelt administration and may have found their first great public expression during the
presidency of Ronald Reagan. For an interesting contemporary account by one of the
architects of the Reagan Presidency, see Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, The Reagan Phenomenon
and the Liberal Tradition, in JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, THE REAGAN PHENOMENON AND
OTHER SPEECHES ON FOREIGN POLICY 3 (1983). Kirkpatrick comments:
More than once it has occurred to me that the elections of 1980 in the United
States bear a certain resemblance to those of 1958 in France .... Why? Because
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I. THE NEW SUBSTANTIVE DIVIDE BETWEEN JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION AND LEGISLATION BY JUDICIAL DECISION

Americans have rejected parliamentary sovereignty since colonial
times. 4 Yet the scope of judicial review has been controversial from the
the Gaullist epoch marked a resurgence of French identity and French selfconfidence after a period of national doubt and denigration; second, because it
marked a significant departure from the period just past; and third, because the
new period of national unity and identity affected both the content and the style
of French foreign and domestic policy, as the new American consensus is likely
to affect both the content and style of American foreign and domestic policy.
Id. at 12.
In outward form, this new direction appears reactionary and theocratic. See, e.g.,
George W. Bush, Inauguration Speech, January 20, 2000, available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/print/inaugural-address.html.
In actuality, however, the new
movement for fundamental change may be neither. Instead, it may be class-based,
hierarchical, feudal, and corporate in outlook. For an early opinion, see A. JAMES
REICHLEY,

CONSERVATIVES

IN AN AGE OF CHANGE:

THE

NIXON

AND FORD

ADMINISTRATIONS (1981). For a later statement in the form of legislative agendas, see
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 11. For a hopeful and idealized vision of the
future, see MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION: THE NEW NATIONALISM
AND THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1995) (emphasizing ethno-culturalism with

a sweet coating of class justice). The movement has found support in political parties and
business factions within the Republic. Thus, there has been recent universal emphasis on
behavior, wealth, and position. This emphasis was dramatically enacted into legislation
and served as the new basis for the provision of federal aid for relief of the poor in 1996.
See, e.g., MICHAEL KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO
THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989); JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE
MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA (1991). It also
accounts for the partial devolution of formal power from the center to the periphery in a
system in which the center retains the power of the purse and the authority to speak for
the entire community to outsiders. For example, even those most in favor of state power
have been careful to retain power over disbursement of revenues at the national level,
assuring fundamental control at the center. For an example, examine the way in which the
programs to aid the poor were modified in 1996; the states were granted substantial
control, but funds and overall direction remained firmly in the control of the national
authority. See, e.g., Larry Cat6i Backer, Welfare Reform at the Limit: An Essay on the
Futilityof "Ending Welfare as We Know It, "30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 (1995).
The fact that great transformations happen over a long period of time in the formal
and normative organization of the Republic is not a new insight.
For a different
perspective, one based on a more traditional "great moments in history" or "big bang"
concept of change, see BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (1991) (offering a grand
view of constitutional law as based on a series of constitutional moments) and, Michael
McConnell, The Forgotten ConstitutionalMoment, 11 CONST. COMMENTARY 115 (1994)
(suggesting an additional constitutional moment -- Reconstruction and the creation of
formal apartheid in the United States). For a critique of this view of constitutional history,
see Eric Foner, The Strange Career of the Reconstruction Amendments, 108 YALE L.J.
2002 (1999). Academics tend to focus less on the current manifestations of the repetition
of normative patterns. Perhaps each generation tends to treat history as ending with it.
24. See, e.g., David Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court. The Powers of the
Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646 (.1982). On John Marshall's views, see
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start of the Republic. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 17892 and
Marbury v. Madison26 appear to authorize judicial review of state and

federal action outside the actor's scope of authority. Yet this
authorization was bitterly contested throughout the history of the early
Republic. More vocal critics included intellectuals who provided the
normative basis of the Confederate States of America, 27 as well as some
of our most revered founders, Madison and Jefferson. 28 The nation was
significantly divided on whether the federal government, and especially
its judicial branch, had the supreme authority to determine the scope of
its own powers and the powers of the member states of the Union. That
debate was settled by war and by the constitutional revolution of the
of the 19th century, from which arose the modern American
second half
29
Republic.

Samuel R. Olken, Chief JusticeJohn Marshall and the Course of American Constitutional
History,33 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 743, 760-63 (2000).
25. 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
26. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). A dated but valuable study of the details of this
case can be found in William Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DUKE L.J. 1.
27. Among the most enduring of these is John C. Calhoun. See A Discourse on the
Constitution and Government of the United States 78, 171, 186-87, 224-28, in JOHN C.
CALHOUN, UNION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 3
(Ross M. Lence ed., 1992) (1850).
28. Jefferson never reconciled himself to the decision in Marbury, and he remained a
bitter political opponent of its author.
I see, as you do, and with the deepest affliction, the rapid strides with which the
federal branch of our government is advancing towards the usurpation of all the
rights reserved to the States, and the consolidation in itself of all powers, foreign
and domestic; and that, too, by constructions which, if legitimate, leave no limits
to their power. Take together the decisions of the federal court, the doctrines of
the President, and the misconstructions of the constitutional compact acted on by
the legislature of the federal branch, and it is but too evident, that the three
ruling branches of that department are in combination to strip their colleagues,
the State authorities, of the powers reserved by them, and to exercise themselves
all functions foreign and domestic.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Giles, December 26, 1825, in JESSE T.
CARPENTER, THE SOUTH AS A CONSCIOUS MINORITY, 1789-1861: A STUDY IN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 75-76 (1930).

29. See, e.g., K. C. WHEARE, supra note 23, at 3-8.
A long controversy, which was not finally closed until after the Civil War of
1861-5, continued between those who regarded the general government as the
agent of the states and those who maintained that it was or ought to be an
independent government. Indeed, it took 'the terrible exercise of prolonged
war,' in Woodrow Wilson's phrase, to resolve the conflict between the two
principles.
Id. at 9 (footnotes omitted).
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Since 1865, the reconstituted American Republic, which had become a
nation rather than a union of states, enforced the long-held consensus
that judicial review was limited only by the self-control of judges t when
voiding statutes,3' construing statutes to avoid defect,32 or mediating
between conflicting assertions of power between the institutions of
federal and state government. 33 The power of courts to fashion remedies
35
was broadly created as well,34-crafting remedies when necessary.

30. See, e.g., SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1990). On the unsettled consensus over the extent of judicial review
permitted under the federal constitution, see CHARLES G. HAINS, THE AMERICAN
DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 88-285 (1959). See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN,
COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
POPULAR GOVERNMENT (1938); LOUIS B. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY
(1938); CHARLES A. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1912).
But see RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969).
31. The power to void statutes is almost as old as the Constitution and is significantly
more controversial. For example, the "void for vagueness" doctrine has been used
effectively in constitutional jurisprudence, sometimes successfully, sometimes not. For a
discussion of the use of the doctrine in the context of the regulation of sexual conduct over
the course of the twentieth century, see Larry CatA Backer, Raping Sodomy and
Sodomizing Rape: A Morality Tale About the Transformation of Modern Sodomy
Jurisprudence,21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 37 (1993). Bush II provides a different context for
voiding statutes. Here, the Supreme Court voids not a legislative act of a legislature but
an interpretive act of a court on the basis of its characterization as "legislation."
32. Familiar canons of construction developed and occasionally applied by the courts,
remind the bar of the power of the court to "remake" law to avoid constitutional
problems. Among them is the canon that ambiguous statutes are to be construed to avoid
constitutional defect. Of course, after Bush II, one can wonder whether, or to what extent,
these canons retain any viability. It is possible, for example, to argue that any construction
for the purpose of avoiding constitutional infirmity amounts to lawmaking. It vests the
courts with the power to make a legislative determination of the basic construction of the
statute -- an act at the core of the legislative function.
33. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (rejecting the right of the
federal government to compel states to administer a federal legislative program); U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (prohibiting states from adding
qualifications to congressional representatives serving the people of that state);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952) (limiting presidential
power to legislate); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923 (1983) (invalidating congressional
veto power of certain administrative acts); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 52 (1982) (invalidating an act empowering Article I bankruptcy judges to
have authority over Article II cases or controversies).
34. "[I]t is also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any
available remedy to make good the wrong done." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946).
The jurisdictional grant of authority under Article III of the Constitution has been
interpreted to provide "not only the authority to decide whether a cause of action is stated
by a plaintiff's claim that he has been injured by a violation of the Constitution, but also
the authority to choose among available judicial remedies in order to vindicate
constitutional rights." Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 374 (1983).
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Yet now, the Supreme Court has articulated a clear distinction
between the scope of judicial review of legislative acts and other judicial
actions. Bush v. Gore appears to create a significantly more narrow
approach to statutory interpretation by the judiciary. The Supreme
Court significantly expands the legal effect of distinguishing between
judicial construction of statutes, which can be characterized as
"interpretation," and construction, of new legal rules, which can be
What is now called interpretation
characterized as "law-making."
constitutes the only form of permissible judicial review. What is now
called law-making is deemed to be beyond the powers of a common law
court, even a court of last resort.36 It is for the federal Supreme Court to
determine the difference between these forms of interpretation.
The Supreme Court reaches this result indirectly. In Bush I, the
concept of interpretive ultra vires can be seen in the shadows. It is
known only in its effects. The principle is constructed out of federal law
relating to congressional power to ascertain a state's presidential
electors.37 It slips in, almost unnoticed:
Since § 5 contains a principle of federal law that would assure
finality of the State's determination if made pursuant to a state
35. Indeed, one of the most ironic aspects of Marbury was Justice Marshall's
construction of Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 creating a remedy of original
jurisdiction in the Supreme Court to issue mandamus against federal officials, where none
appeared to exist in the plain language of the statute. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803). For a modem example of the extent of the remedial powers of the
Supreme Court, see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 1516 (1971) (establishing extensive school busing based on race percentages for remedying
unconstitutional race segregation in schools).
36. As a technical matter for the moment it is more precise to say that this limitation
is true at least in certain circumstances. The U.S. Supreme Court speaks only to the
peculiar actions of the Florida Supreme Court construing a statute under the singular
circumstances of a contested American presidential election. But doctrine has a nasty
habit of jumping the borders of the precise factual context in which it arises, however
singular. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself demonstrated this jumping power of
jurisprudential ideas in two decisions issued at the close of the last term - Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), and Board of Regents of the University of
Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000). In Southworth, a majority of the
Supreme Court determined that the fee program created a public forum by close analogy.
529 U.S. at 241. "In Boy Scouts of America, the majority stretches to make new
constitutional doctrine by the process of analogy. This time, the object was to stretch the
relevance and utility of Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of
Boston, Inc., [515 U.S. 557 (1995)] the way the majority in Southworth stretched the public
forum doctrine to accommodate the facts as they found them in that case." Larry Cat6
Backer, Disciplining Judicial Interpretation of Fundamental Rights: First Amendment
Decadence in Southworth and Boy Scouts of America and European Alternatives, 36
TULSA L.J. 117, 136 (2000).
37. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
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law in effect before the election, a legislative wish to take
advantage of the "safe harbor" would counsel against any
construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to
be a change in the law.38

The thrust of this thought is plain enough. Florida courts are free to
interpret Florida law but not if that interpretation could, in turn, be
interpreted by the national legislative body as a change in the state law as
construed by the courts.39 The Florida courts appear to have no authority

over this legislative determination of the character of their judicial
decisions.4" Without fanfare, it now appears settled that the national
legislature can, by statute, limit the jurisdiction of state courts over state
law questions. Moreover, a new distinction can now be made between
judicial decisions construing statutes.
Judicial decisions labeled
"interpretation," that is, judicial decisions that would not, in the opinion
of the legislature change the law, continue to enjoy the traditional
authority of judicial decisions. 4' However, a new species of judicial
interpretation, labeled "legislation," has been identified. This species of
interpretation is now beyond the authority of the courts. It is an
interpretation that effects a change in the law.
It is hard to imagine so much from so little in Bush L However, the
implications of that sentence, the intent of the authors of that innocuous
thought, was revealed well enough in the many opinions produced in

38. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000).
39. See id.
40. See id. Here is Chief Justice Marshall's principle of judicial deference to
legislative constitutional findings in McCulloch v. Marylandturned on its head:
But it is conceived, that a doubtful question, one on which human reason may
pause, and the human judgment be suspended, in the decision of which the great
principles of liberty are not concerned, but the respective powers of those who
are equally the representatives of the people, are to be adjusted; if not put at rest
by the practice of government, ought to receive a considerable impression from
that practice.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819). It is now the legislative body
which must determine the amount of deference due judicial interpretation where doubtful
questions of constitutional interpretation are presented.
41. As the dissents in Bush 11 remind us, decisions that can still be characterized as
"interpretation" continue to enjoy traditional protection. Such decisions do not produce
interpretations "unreasonable to the point of displacing the legislative enactment .. " See
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 131 (2001) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter explained
that the "majority view is in each instance within the bounds of reasonable interpretation,
and the law as declared is consistent with Article II." Id. See also id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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Bush II, rather than in the per curiam opinion itself.42 "The Chief Justice
maintains that Florida's Supreme Court has veered so far from the
ordinary practice of judicial review that what it did cannot properly be
called judging." 43 The Chief Justice suggests that the Florida Supreme
Court's decision, as interpreted in turn by the U.S. Supreme Court,
"infringed upon the legislature's authority" 44 and amounted to law
making of the worst sort by "step[ping] away from this established
practice, prescribed by the Secretary, the state official charged by the
legislature with 'responsibility to ...[o]btain and maintain uniformity in
the application, operation, and interpretation of the election laws,'...
[thus] depart[ing] from the legislative scheme, 45 and "from the statutory
framework in place on November 7." 6
The new limitation on the interpretive power of the courts is
announced in a manner in which its existence can be plausibly denied.
Invoked as nothing more than the routine application of venerable
doctrine, it operates under this cover to produce a new and significant
doctrine for the limitation of the power of courts to interpret statutes.
Indeed, the Chief Justice goes to some lengths, in an off-handed way, to
suggest that there is nothing novel about the conclusions of the Court in
Bush II. He cites a number of cases to prove the point that "[t]hough we
generally defer to state courts on the interpretation of state law there are
to
of course areas in which the Constitution requires this Court
47
law."
state
of
analysis
deferential,
still
if
undertake an independent,
The doctrine of impermissible interpretation comes in two parts. The
first is that state courts exceed their interpretive authority when their
42. The necessities of coalition building for purposes of cobbling together an
agreement among a majority of the members of the Supreme Court produced a per curiam
opinion in Bush H that carefully avoided the issue.
The petition presents the following questions: whether the Florida Supreme
Court established new standards for resolving Presidential election contests,
2, of the United States Constitution and failing
thereby violating Art. II, § 1, cl.
to comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5, and whether the use of standardless manual recounts
violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. With respect to the
equal protection question, we find a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 103.
43. Id. at 135-36 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 120 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 122. The Florida Supreme Court decision also failed for authorizing openended proceedings that would extend beyond a deadline set by the Chief Justice. Id.
47. Id. at 114. The Chief Justice then cites two cases from the height of the
segregation wars, in which the federal Supreme Court struck down state high court action.
The cases he cites are: NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) and
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). Id. at 114-15.
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interpretation amounts to an arbitrary exercise in legislation. The second
is that, under those circumstances, the Supreme Court has the authority
to void such non-judicial action.
The doctrine of impermissible interpretation is built on the sort of
precious hyper-legal analysis that has come to characterize the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court at its most devious.4" This smoke
and mirrors analysis of the Chief Justice does not go unnoticed. Justice
Ginsburg does a credible job of exposing the Chief Justice's construction
of the interpretation and legislation doctrine from a tangentially relevant
judicial history in which the Supreme Court sought to enforce its power
against the defiance of state high courts. 4' Justice Ginsburg observes that
the cases cited by the Chief Justice were extraordinary in the sense that
each representes an act which was part of a greater and deliberate
attempt to thwart a greater federal policy, law, or treaty. Fairfax's
Devisee involved the implementation of a federal treaty while Patterson
and Bouie represented instances in which state supreme courts were
participating in a concerted attempt to thwart the implementation of
federal race policy. Thus, the three cases involved actual and clear
attempts to block federal policy or law indirectly. The decision of the
Florida Supreme Court, on the other hand, represented a completely

48. This sort of decadent jurisprudence has recently been discussed, especially in the
First Amendment area:
Two decisions of the Supreme Court, issued at the close of the 2000 term - Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, and Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin
System v. Southiworth - provide a stunning illustration of the decadent and
baroque qualities of constitutional adjudication that is slowly sapping the vigor of
juridical authority to interpret our "Basic Law." Each is an expression of the
overripe over-conceptualization of the interstices of constitutional law.
Protection of the right of "expression" and of "association" lie buried under
multiple layers of doctrine now critical to the core expression of the "right," but
only related to that core expression by six degrees of separation. Expression and
association become lost in "expressive association," "public accommodation,"
"public forum" and other subsidiary standards, tests and doctrines. Doctrine,
and its twists and turns - the periphery - become the core about which the central
right is focused.
Larry CatA Backer, Disciplining Judicial Interpretation of Fundamental Rights: First
Amendment Decadence in Southworth and Boy Scouts of America And European
Alternatives, 36 TULSA L.J. 117,121-22 (2000).
49. Justice Ginsburg argued: "The Chief Justice's casual citation of these cases might
lead one to believe they are part of a larger collection of cases in which we said that the
Constitution impelled us to train a skeptical eye on a state court's portrayal of state law.
But one would be hard pressed, I think, to find additional cases that fit the mold." Bush
I1,531 U.S. at 140 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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different context. As such, those cases were inapplicable to Bush I
Indeed, as Justice Stevens stated, the only way Patterson, Fairfax's
Devisee, and Bouie could be relevant are as "an unstated lack of
confidence in the impartiality and capacity of the state judges who would
make the critical decisions if the vote count were to proceed."51 Justice
Breyer honed in on the Chief Justice's "unusual review of state law in
this case" to concentrate on disproving that the Florida Supreme Court
impermissibly distorted Florida statute.52
The hyper-legality of modern Supreme Court jurisprudence not only
makes the Chief Justice's arguments possible, it makes them plausible.
Even if inapplicable in Bush II, as some of the Justices suggested, the
interpretation and legislation doctrine, now restated and broadened, will
be available for application to cases in which it otherwise would have
been extraordinary for the Supreme Court to intervene. Indeed, even
the Justices who disagreed with the doctrine's application against the
Florida Supreme Court do not necessarily reject the newly articulated
limitation on the authority of courts. Consider the approach of the
dissenting Justices on this point. Justice Ginsburg explained that she:
might join the Chief Justice were it [her] commission to
interpret Florida law. But disagreement with the Florida court's
interpretation of its own State's law does not warrant the
conclusion that the justices of that court have legislated. There
is no cause here to believe that the members of Florida's high
court have done less than "their mortal best to discharge their
oath of office," and no cause to upset their reasoned
interpretation of Florida law.53
Justice Breyer also accepts the proposition that judicial construction of
statutes has its limits. For Justice Breyer, a court can interpret any
statute in so "misguided" a way "as no longer to qualify as judicial
interpretation or as [to constitute] a usurpation of the authority of the
state legislature." His only disagreement with the Chief Justice on this
score lies in his conclusion that the Florida courts did not "legislate."55
Justice Souter also accepts the proposition of the Bush lawyers that
interpretation can so "transcend the accepted bounds of statutory
50. Id. at 140-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Florida Supreme Court "surely
should not be bracketed with state high courts of the Jim Crow South." Id. at 141.
51.
Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 147 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 136 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549
(1981)).
54. Id. at 152 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
55. Id.

1074

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 51:101

interpretation, to the point of being a nonjudicial act and producing new
law, untethered to the legislative Act in question."56 Even Justice
Stevens does not contest the proposition, implicit in his arguments, that
courts may "change" statutory law in the course of interpretation, and
that this may amount to impermissible lawmaking. Justice Stevens
asserts only that "neither in this case, nor in its earlier opinion in [Bush
/],did the Florida Supreme Court make any substantive change in
Florida electoral law."57
At first blush, this limitation on the interpretive power of inferior
courts seems to favor the Supreme Court. It is, after all, the Supreme
Court that has reserved for itself a power to judge the character of other
courts' interpretation. Yet, the ultimate beneficiary of the new doctrine
is the legislature; thus the doctrine has the potential for great effect. As a
general principle of law, it provides a powerful new tool to deny the
authority of judicial pronouncements. Any interpretation can be
characterized as a change in the law. The effects of almost every
interpretive act is to change the understanding of the underlying text.
The difference between interpretation and legislation is merely a matter
of degree." As such, distinctions of this type can easily result in the
56. Id. at 131 (Souter, J.dissenting) (restating, before refuting, Bush's position).
Justice Souter, like Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, devotes much of his opinion to proving
that the interpretation of the Florida Supreme Court, while perhaps misguided, was not
unreasonable. See id. at 138. "Whatever people of good will and good sense may argue
about the merits of the Florida court's reading, there is no warrant for saying that it
transcends the limits of reasonable statutory interpretation to the point of supplanting the
statute enacted by the 'legislature' within the meaning of Article II." Id. at 133.
57. Id. at 127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens, however, clearly rejectes
the notion of judicial interpretation as law making of an impermissible kind. In a
footnote, Justice Stevens asserts the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court that "[ljike any
other judicial interpretation of a statute, its opinion was an authoritative interpretation of
what the statute's relevant provisions have meant since they were enacted." Id. at 128 n.6
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
58. Conceivably, acceptance of this interpretation-to-legislation continuum underlies
the reluctance of the dissenting opinions to suggest categorically that interpretation can
never fundamentally alter the text interpreted and thereby amount to legislation. Yet,
judicial practice from the inception of the current Republic has been based on a tacit
acceptance of the idea that there is no break between interpretation and legislation when a
court confronts ambiguities in or application of a text. Consider, in this light, whether the
construction of section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, did not, in effect, modify the text
without the imprimatur of the legislature and thus amount to law making. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137, 174-79 (1803). It follows, from the creation of an
interpretation-lawmaking divide, that in cases of ambiguity it is not for the courts, but for
the legislature, to determine the precise meaning of its acts in order for any court to avoid
law making in the guise of judging. As such, it may be that what follows from the
reasoning of Bush H is that the courts, including the federal Supreme Court, must consult
the legislative branches in the construction of statutes before they may rule on their
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presumption can serve as the basis of a rule that treats any judicial
interpretation of a statute that can change the result in a given case or
under a given set of circumstances as law-making, and thus void. This
sort of doctrinal result is nothing new to the Supreme Court. It simply
mirrors earlier attempts to distinguish between "substance" and
"procedure" after Erie,9 which resulted in interpretive regimes in which
virtually any difference between state and federal law was deemed
"substantive.'6

In its most radical iteration, the use of this interpretation/legislation
distinction can be applied by Congress to the "interpretative" judgments
constitutionality in order to avoid law making. If this is not a necessary implication, then it
is possible that Bush H merely stands for the proposition that constitutional decision
making provides no precedential or predictive value. Either view represents a movement
away from current mythology of the function of the federal courts and the character and
utility of its decisions.
59. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 641, 78-80 (1938) (establishing the rule that
in diversity cases before the federal courts, state law is to be applied by the court unless a
different result is required under federal constitutional or statutory law).
60. Cases after Erie interpreted the command in that case to require a strict
interpretation of Erie, and tests were structured for that purpose. See Guaranty Trust Co.
of N.Y. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of
"procedure" in some sense. The question is ... does it significantly affect the
result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be
controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?
...In essence, the intent of [Erie] was to ensure that, in all cases where a federal
court is exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the
parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially
the same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would
be if tried in a State court.
Id. at 109.
The problem was nicely explained by Justice Harlan in his concurrence in Hanna v.
Plummer, a case that held that the York outcome-determinative test cannot be applied
mechanically, but must be guided by the goals of discouraging forum shopping and
avoiding inequitable administration of laws. See generally Hanna v. Plummer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965). Justice Harlan responded, "The Court is quite right in stating that the
'outcome determinative' test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, if taken literally, proves
too much, for any rule, no matter how clearly 'procedural,' can affect the outcome of
litigation if it is not obeyed." Id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
The courts continue to struggle with the problem of application of tests of presumptive
effect. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 419 (1996)
(applying state law for review of jury awards). The point is that the Supreme Court
has turned descriptive boundaries with consequential effect, like those between
substance and procedure, into presumptions meant to prevent an erroneous
application of federal substance. There is nothing to prevent the Supreme Court from
articulating an "outcome determinative" test of sorts for judicial interpretation and
lawmaking.
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of the Supreme Court to the same extent as the Supreme Court applies it
to state high courts interpreting state law. While the Supreme Court may
hide behind the Constitution, claiming supra-judicial authority against
the Congress, it is hard to distinguish as a matter of logic or
constitutional interpretation the difference between the possibility of
faulty interpretation by a state high court and the possibility of faulty
ineterpretation by the nation's high court. In either case, at least
according to the Bush distinctions, the courts would be "making" law
rather than "saying what the law is." Like the Florida courts, the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of statutes or the Constitution, could be
so unreasonable that it amounts to a non-judicial act in violation of the
Court's authority under Article III of the federal Constitution. The Bush
cases suggest the principle that the power to make such a determination,
like the power to determine what constitutes a change in the law for
purposes of 3 U.S.C. § 5, will likely fall to Congress." It is in this sense,
perhaps, that the broad mandate carved out by the Court itself two
hundred years ago in Marbury could be used against itself. Should
Congress ever decide that a Supreme Court decision on a point of
constitutional law is unreasonable, the Supreme Court has given
Congress the legal basis for overturning such interpretation as "a
nonjudicial act... producing new law untethered to the legislative Act in
question." 62 The Supreme Court has now fashioned a jurisprudence in
which courts may no longer have the authority to do "what courts do."
As Justice Stevens suggests somewhat elliptically in his dissent, this
power to say what the law is may now give way to a recognition of the
61. The Burger Court provides a basis for creating a doctrine of this type. See, e.g.,
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985) ("But the principal
and basic limit on the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action - the built in restraints that our system provides through state participation in federal
governmental action."). This notion of congressional supremacy can be applied, by
analogy, to limit the role of the federal courts. Justice Powell understood the potential, as
yet unrealized, when he stated in dissent that "[t]his result is inconsistent with the
fundamental principles of our constitutional system. At least since Marbury v. Madison, it
has been the settled province of the federal judiciary 'to say what the law is' with respect
to the constitutionality of acts of Congress." Id. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
62. Bush I, 531 U.S. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch. 137, 177
(1803)) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is."). Ironically, the interpretation/legislation distinction can be harmonized with
Marbury. If the province of the courts is the judicial sphere, then judicial activity that has
the effect of amending statutes or the Constitution clearly falls outside that sphere. Such
activity, according to the logic of Marbury, belongs to the legislature and the people, as
ultimate sovereigns.
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power of the legislature to take that determination from the courts. That
this result is not serendipitous, at least in the minds of some of the
younger members of the Court, does not bode well for continued judicial
control of the extent of the judiciary's own interpretive powers. 6'
II. FEDERAL JUDICIAL SUPREMACY

The Bush cases are bundled in irony and paradox. While the Supreme
Court has provided a basis for substantially narrowing the scope of
judicial review of statutes, it has also articulated a basis for the

consolidation of its own powers over the judiciary, particularly the state
judiciary. In a sense, the stage is set for the federalization of state courts
under the broadest possible reading of dicta in cases such as: Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee65 and Cohens v. Virginia.66 The Chief Justice does not
disguise this aim in Bush H.67 He states:
64. See, e.g., Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 362 (1989) (dealing with the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984). In his dissent, Justice Scalia somewhat prophetically stated his view:
The whole theory of lawful congressional "delegation" is not that Congress is
sometimes too busy or too divided and can therefore assign its responsibility of
making law to someone else; but rather that a certain degree of discretion, and
thus of lawmaking, inheres in most executive or judicial action, and it is up to
Congress, by the relative specificity or generality of its statutory commands, to
determine - up to a point - how small or how large that degree shall be.
Id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328, 380 (1816). But see Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.)
441, 448 (1850) (explaining that Congress has authority to withhold jurisdiction from
inferior courts). Indeed, there exists a cottage industry of academics and other crafting
principles and methods of all sorts for this very purpose. Much of it has been fueled by
Supreme Court decisions in the twentieth century on separation of religion and sexual
mores. See, e.g., EDWARD KEYNES & RANDALL MILLER, THE COURT VS. CONGRESS:
PRAYER, BUSING AND ABORTION (1989) (curbing jurisdiction of the federal courts);

(1969) (attacking the principle of
federal court power of judicial review of legislative acts and the Constitution).
66. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 447 (1821). The broad nationalist dicta in these cases has
been challenged. For a discussion of Congress' power to restrict the jurisdiction of the
federal courts, see MARTIN REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER (1980).
67. The Chief Justice cited as an example the requirement that the Supreme Court
analyze state property law in determining whether property has been taken in violation of
the Takings Clause. He explained:
That constitutional guarantee would, of course, afford no protection against state
power if our inquiry could be concluded by a state supreme court holding that
state property law accorded the plaintiff no rights. In one of our oldest cases, we
similarly made an independent evaluation of state law in order to protect federal
treaty guarantees.
Bush I, 531 U.S. at 115 n.1 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) and Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 603 (1812)).
RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT
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This inquiry does not imply a disrespect for state courts but
rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state
legislatures. To attach definitive weight to the pronouncement
of a state court, when the very question at issue is whether the
court has actually departed from the statutory meaning, would
be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce the explicit
requirements of Article II.
If one is to believe some of our judges, the federal Constitution itself
now appears to give the Supreme Court the authority to review the
internal governance of states as long as some federal constitutional
connection can be made. It also appears that the Constitution devolves
power down to the states, at least with respect to matters that are within
the province of the federal government. Likewise, it seems probable that
the Supreme Court can, assert authority over issues involving state
organization or powers. Indeed, that seems to have been the thrust of
Bush l's understated but clear suggestion that the federal Constitution
"took" from the Florida State Constitution the authority to determine
the distribution of power between its coordinate branches of
government, vesting the state legislature with authority beyond any
authority conveyed by the state constitution. 69
The Bush decisions constitute another step in the construction of a
new constitutional doctrine: the negative federal question doctrine. Like
the doctrine of the negative Commerce Clause, an expanded doctrine of
negative federal question significantly enlarges the discretionary power
of the Supreme Court to intervene in the affairs of the states.70 Almost
all of the opinions in Bush H add weight to the notion that there may be
no issue that does not contain within it a federal question, even if only
negatively or indirectly. As a consequence, there may be no issue of state
law beyond the power of the Supreme Court to judge. Justice Souter's
analysis of the lack of interpretive failure in the decision of the Florida
Supreme Court is based on the notion that the Florida Supreme Court
could have engaged in impermissible interpretation and legislation by
68. Id.
69. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curium).
"Specifically, we are unclear as to the extent to which the Florida Supreme Court saw the
Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature's authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2."
Id.
70. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice
comes to this reluctantly, but no less aggressively. Justice Stevens, however, suggests some
restraint: "Neither § 5 nor Article II grants federal judges any special authority to
substitute their views for those of the state judiciary on matters of state law." Id. at 124
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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declaring law different from "the provisions made by the legislature, to
which the National Constitution commits responsibility for determining
how each State's Presidential electors are chosen."'" Justice Ginsburg
takes a more traditional position, but one which also admits this
possibility. 2 Justice Breyer deals with the possibility as a necessity born
of the aggressive activism of his more traditionalist colleagues.
The basis for this extension runs parallel to a similar extension of
authority articulated by the European Court of Justice.74 While the
federal judiciary is one of limited authority, the primary authority of
those courts must include the power to judge whether any action
undertaken by any person, under color of either federal or state
authority, directly or indirectly touches on the basic normative rules of
behavior memorialized in the Constitution. Because all governmental
acts may have direct or indirect constitutional effect, the Supreme Court
has the authority to review all acts, even those over which it has no direct
jurisdiction.
Additional evidence of the federalization of state courts can be seen in
the Bush cases' use of due process and equal protection principles. In
Bush I and Bush II, due process and equal protection are emphasized as
the bases for the construction of general federal constitutional principles
71. Id. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 142 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg states: "Even in the
rare case in which a State's 'manner' of making and construing laws might implicate a
structural constraint, Congress, not this Court, is likely the proper governmental entity to
enforce that constraint." Id.
73. Id. at 147-48. Though asserting that the case raised no substantial federal
question, Justice Breyer was constrained to devote pages of analysis to the possibility and
the refutation of arguments for the rejection of the opinion of the Florida Supreme Court
on those grounds. He says, "[Mioreover, even were such review proper, the conclusion
that the Florida Supreme Court's decision contravenes federal law is untenable." Id.
74. Case C-107/94, Asscher v. Staatssecretaris van Financian, 1996 E.C.R. 1-3089,
[1996] 3 C.M.L.R. 61 (1996). In this case, the European Court of Justice opined that
though direct taxation fell within the competence of the Member States of the European
Union and not the Union itself, the European Court of Justice nonetheless had authority
to review Member State enactment of tax statutes falling outside the authority of the
European Union to determine whether the Member State's exercise of its competence was
consistent with the constitutional order of the European Union. Id. at XX. In that case,
specifically, the European Court of Justice reviewed Member State tax statutes to
determine whether the statutes at issue caused any overt or covert discrimination on
grounds of nationality, which is prohibited under the treaties establishing the European
Union. For a discussion of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, see
MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION (1998); THE EUROPEAN COURTS AND
NATIONAL COURTS - DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENCE (Anne-Marie Slaughter et al.
eds., 1998); TREVOR C. HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN

UNION (1999).
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of law, which are applicable to all actions and which vest the Supreme
Court with the authority to review all governmental action for fairness.75
More importantly, these principles now provide a basis for the
disciplining of state high courts. That basis is substantive; here is the real
utility of a case like Bouie v. City of Columbia,76 to the concurring
opinion. Ironically, the decision continues the trend started by the
Warren Court to federalize, at least by negative implication, all state law
under the Fourteenth Amendment, including the law that the Bush 11 per
curiam opinion tells us is within the sole purview of the state legislature
under Article II.7 That federalization vests the Supreme Court with the
authority to pass on the actions of them according to any branch of state
government and to judge the general principles of constitutional law,
including but not limited to those principles of fairness set forth in the
75. See generally Larry Cati Backer, Fairness as a General Principle of American
Constitutional Law: Applying Extra-Constitutional Principles to Constitutional Cases in
Hendricks and M.L.B., 33 TULSA L.J. 135 (1997) (discussing the efforts of the U.S.
Supreme Court to construct extra-constitutional principles of constitutional law, and the
assertion of its power to review all governmental action on the basis of these norms).
76. 378 U.S. 347 (1964). For a discussion of the intersections of race and the
jurisprudence of Bush II, see infra Part V.
77. Indeed, the thrust of the concurrence of the Chief Justice was based on this
notion. See Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 112-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice
borrowed from NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and Bouie v.
City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), the idea that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides the Supreme Court with authority to void any state
supreme court statutory interpretation that can be characterized as "legislative" and
therefore, non-judicial, that is, when it appears too novel. Id. A recent commentary on
Bouie noted:
Had the Court been reviewing a federal court's construction of a federal statute,
it probably would have employed standard tools of statutory construction to
reverse the court's interpretation and construe the statute more narrowly. But
the Court did not have that option in Bouie. As a matter of statutory
interpretation, the United States Supreme Court generally accepts as controlling
a state supreme court's construction of the laws of that state. Thus, even if the
Bouie Court thought the South Carolina courts had misinterpreted their trespass
statute, it was beyond the Court's ken to tell South Carolina how to read its own
laws. Unable to adopt its own reading of the statute, the Court instead engaged
in a kind of damage control: It invoked the Due Process Clause to constrain the
retroactive application of the state's reading. Bouie, therefore, may tell us more
about the specific power of federal courts to impose due process limits on state
courts' application of their own laws than it does about the full scope of the fair
warning requirement in federal criminal cases.
Trevor W. Morrison, Fair Warning and the Retroactive Judicial Expansion of Federal
CriminalStatutes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 455, 477-78 (2001). Rehnquist's concurrence in Bush
II follows almost naturally: "What we would do in the present case is precisely parallel:
Hold that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the Florida election laws
impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair reading required, in violation of Article
I." Bush II, 53t U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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Fourteenth Amendment. 8 Thus, irrespective of the Florida Supreme
Court's authority to interpret state legislation, its determination and
construction of the statute does "not satisfy the minimum requirement
for nonarbitrary treatment of voters necessary to secure the fundamental
right" to vote under the federal equal protection clause.79 Indeed, state
supreme courts, reduced to little more than the inferior courts of the
federal court system, may be distinguished from federal circuit courts of
appeal only by reference to their subject matter jurisdiction."
Yet, one can argue that this argument states the obvious. For years
now, when it has suited its members, the Supreme Court has stated that
the highest organ of the federal judicial branch has always had the power
to treat all matters of local and state law, even those touching on powers
never delegated to the federal government under the federal
78. Justice Breyer well captures the essence of the change:
Petitioners invoke fundamental fairness, namely, the need for procedural
fairness, including finality. But with the one "equal protection" exception, they
rely upon law that focuses, not upon that basic need, but upon the constitutional
Respondents invoke a competing fundamental
allocation of power.
consideration - the need to determine the voter's true intent. But they look to
state law, not to federal constitutional law, to protect that interest .... And the
more fundamental equal protection claim might have been left to the state court
to resolve if and when it was discovered to have mattered .... The Constitution
and federal statutes themselves make clear that restraint is appropriate. They set
forth a roadmap of how to resolve disputes about electors, even after an election
as close as this one. That roadmap foresees resolution of electoral disputes by
But it nowhere provides for involvement by the United States
state courts ....
Supreme Court.
Bush H, 531 U.S. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 105. While interesting and important in its own right, this article does not
address the application of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, though the Supreme Court has arguably broken new ground in
this area as well.
80. Even putting aside the arrogance and condescension of the speaker (a former law
clerk to Chief Justice Rehnquist), consider the construction of judicial hierarchy assumed
in the following exchange:
KONDRACKE: Why couldn't they have just left this to the political branches of
government, the Florida legislature, and then ultimately the Congress of the
United States? MAHONEY: Well, I don't think that would have been
appropriate because the errors that had been committed here were by a lower
court. The Florida Supreme Court is subject to review under our constitution by
the United States Supreme Court. And so it really was the job of the U.S.
Supreme Court to correct those errors. In fact, I think that the United States
Supreme Court really did a service to the Florida Supreme Court because the
one thing we really don't like is to have confrontations between the judicial
branches of government and the legislative branches. And that's really where we
were headed.
Fox News Network, The Beltway Boys: Interview of Maureen Mahoney by Mort
Kondracke (Fox Television broadcast, Dec. 16, 2000 (Transcript # 121604cb.257)).
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Constitution, as pregnant with issues of federal constitutional law.
Cooper v. Aaron,"' for example, is a modern case in point. In Cooper,
Bush I, and Bush II, there were significant issues of power at stake.
Cooper was decided in a context in which the very power of the Supreme
Court was challenged. Bush was decided in the context of a political
battle to determine control of the machinery of elections, and thus,
indirectly, the control of the power to appoint members to the judiciary."'
However, there are differences and ironies between those cases and
the Bush decisions. Cooper is understood as being less extensive than a
breezy reading of the opinion might suggest.' Traditionalist jurists and
prominent members of the federal government have argued that the
dicta in Cooper has never been accepted as reflecting a common
understanding of the authority of the federal judiciary. 4 Yet, to the
chagrin of many traditionalist jurists, including several of those signing
on to the concurrence in Bush 11,85 the Supreme Court in the second half
81. 358 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (discussing the resistance to Brown by the Governor of
Arkansas who aided the efforts of the Little Rock School District to resist racial
integration). The decision has found supporters within the legal academy. See, e.g., Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359,1362 (1997).
82. This power to appoint members to the judiciary has been a significant political
question in this country since the appointment of John Marshall by the Federalist party at
the dawn of the Republic. The story of the midnight appointment of John Marshall to the
Supreme Court by a dying Federalist administration eager to preserve what power it could
through the courts is well known. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN ET AL., 1 THE GREAT
REPUBLIC: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 350 (1992).
83. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as
Explanationsfor Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 79 (1993); David Cole, The Value
of Seeing Things Differently: Boerne v. Floresand CongressionalEnforcement of the Bill of
Rights, 1997 SuP. CT. REV. 31; MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY
FROM THE COURTS 182 (1999).
84. See, e.g., Edwin Meese, ll, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979
(1987). Commentators representing conflicting political and jurisprudential camps have
echoed the concerns of Ronald Reagan's Attorney General. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent,
The Supreme Court as an Enforcement Agency, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1149,1188-1201
(1998); John Harrison, The Role of the Legislative and Executive Branches in Interpreting
the Constitution, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 371, 372-74 (1988); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The
Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217,
228-62 (1994); Sanford Levinson, Could Meese Be Right This Time?, 61 TUL. L. REV.
1071, 1075-78 (1987). The structural tensions highlighted by the aggressive language of
Cooper now extend to other areas of intergovernmental conflict. See, e.g., Mark D.
Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-ConstitutionalFederal Law: Of Tribal
Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479 (2000).
85. In particular, besides the Chief Justice, Justices Thomas, O'Connor, and Scalia
have been at the forefront of the current crop of judges urging restraint by the judiciary
and a more modest role for the court in the political sphere. See, e.g., Bob Jones
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 612 (1983) (holding that a university practicing
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applying
of the twentieth century has not been above
•
86 the Cooper dicta in
•
matters of aggressive constitutional interpretation. But therein lies a
great irony. Jurists at the forefront of disavowing the broadest reading of
Cooper have now effectively cast the dicta of Cooper into the essence of
the holding in Bush II. Here is a great example of short-sighted revenges
of political venality, using the weapons of jurisprudential opponents
against their authors, with significant collateral effect on national
institutions. The arrogance of judicial lawmaking wielded by the hands
of those who had stood for so long as the champions of judicial restraint.
The additional irony in Bush placed the dissent in the position of
rejecting the more far-reaching implications of Cooper.
There is no doubt those pushing Cooper to its limits will attempt, like
those responsible for Cooper, to draw back. After all, Cooper was
decided under a unique set of facts: the desegregation battles of the
disfavored discrimination cannot have tax exempt status). "As this Court has said over
and over again, regardless of our view on the propriety of Congress' failure to legislate we
are not constitutionally empowered to act for it." Id. For an interesting case in this
regard, see the Chief Justice's opinion in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993), which
severely limited judicial role in federal impeachments. It may provide insight into the
Chief Justice's willingness to extend the power of the Supreme Court in the context of
resolving the victor of the recent Presidential elections, or conceivably his sacrifice of longheld beliefs on the altar of other needs.
The concept of a textual commitment to a coordinate political department is not
completely separate from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards which may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable
commitment to a coordinate branch. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238. Ironically, Justice Souter in
concurrence suggested that the Court, and not constitutional text, was the real arbiter of
judicial action in a particular case. He suggested that "[i]f the Senate were to act in a
manner seriously threatening the integrity of its results... judicial interference might well
be appropriate." Id. at 253-54 (Souter, J., concurring).
86. Just recently, the Chief Justice authored an opinion in which he used Cooper v.
Aaron to justify or explain a holding that the federal Violence Against Women Act of
1994 exceeded Congress' power under the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 616-17 n.7 (2000).
It is thus a "permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system" that "'the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution."'
No doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting and applying the
Constitution, but ever since Marbury, this Court has remained the ultimate
expositor of the constitutional text. As we emphasized in United States v.
Nixon: "In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of
the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the
interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the
others. . . Many decisions of this Court, however, have unequivocally
reaffirmed the holding of Marbury that '[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."'
Id. (citations omitted).
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middle of the twentieth century. Bush II was also decided under equally
unique circumstances. Yet, the language of the decision and the actions
of the Court stand. They are memorialized and have become, in the
words of the Supreme Court itself, the supreme law of the land."' These
words stand ready to give comfort to those who deem it necessary to
exploit them under another set of "unique" or "important"
circumstances."' Just as the judicial detractors of Cooper used the
teaching of that "unique" case to craft Bush, so will some future court
use the teaching of Bush, another "unique" case, to craft yet another
difficult or unique case.
III. NEGATIVE FEDERALISM

The use of the Constitution as a direct limitation on the republican
character of state government,g9 and in Bush II on the distribution of
power within state government, further consolidates current
constitutional understandings based on a presumption. It presumes that
states have no power other than that permitted under the Constitution.
Just as the Bush Court uses Cooper to construct a doctrine of "negative

federal question" and to expand federal judicial supremacy, the Bush
Court uses the issue of Florida election laws to extend the supremacy of
federal institutions over those of the states. Here, the implications of

87.
In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referred to
the Constitution as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation," and declared
in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison that "[i]t is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." This decision declared the
basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution, and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the
country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
88. We should not be surprised. Lawyers have been weaned on Alexis de
Tocqueville's observation, elevated now to an incantation, that "[t]here is hardly a
political question in the United States which does not sooner or later turn into a judicial
one." The result is the creation of a judiciary with "immense political power." ALEXIS DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 100-01 (J.P. Meyar ed., George Lawrence,
trans. 1969).
89. The states inserted into the Constitution language that obligates the federal
government to "guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government." U.S. CONST. Art. IV, § 4. A Supreme Court of another era, however,
determined that the Guarantee Clause was enforceable only by Congress or the President,
perhaps by force of arms. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 2 (1849) (questioning the
constitutionality of the government of Rhode Island). As a result, federal regulation of
state government has found a conceptual home in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Bush 11 decision represents a further extension of the
power of this clause in the regulation of states.
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McColloch v. Maryland are at their limit. Here is US. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton9 stretched in the service of the national government by those
most firmly opposed philosophically to that enterprise. 2 Here, we reap
the whirlwind unleashed by the so-called progressivism of a generation
ago, the election cases. 93 Here, the politics of revenge find great irony the members of the Supreme Court most bent on undoing the American
vision most clearly expressed in the nationalization of American life after
World War II use the most detested jurisprudential tools of that
federalization to expand the basis of federal authority over states. In
doing so, they reach a decision whose outcome reaps political revenge
against the faction of the American elite held responsible for the
detested federalization. The effect is operatic.
In Bush H, members of the Supreme Court declare, as settled law, the
notion that the Constitution directly grants power to certain institutions
of state government. 94' Of course, it flies in the face of both history and
the construction of the American federal system to assume that power
flows down from the federal government to the states, and thereafter, if
at all, to the people. Traditionally, Americans were careful to speak of

90. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 326, 334 (1819) (upholding the validity of federal
chartering of banks, voiding a state tax on federal instrumentalities, and proclaiming a
broad view of federal power as against the states).
91. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). A divided Supreme Court determined that the federal
government, not the states, had authority to impose term limits on federal elected officials.
Id. at 837.
92. Ironically enough, the dissenters in US. Term Limits, who had vigorously
supported the authority of states as against the federal power, were those who in Bush If
applied the rationales of the majority in US. Term Limits to limit the power of states with
respect to federal elections. The members of the majority in US. Term Limits took a
more state-friendly position in Bush H. Here, one sees the politics of revenge at work on
the Court. Consider the delights of the Bush I1 concurrence stretching the rationales of
the majority opinion in U.S. Term Limits to effect a result anathema to the US. Term
Limits majority. As an exercise in personal power politics, the result would be most
satisfying to the players on the Court who won this round.
93. The election cases were based on application of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment - the same provision found to be critical to the determination
of the Bush II decision. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (finding a state
apportionment question justiciable on equal protection grounds); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964) (limiting states to population-based representation in their legislatures);
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (finding state freeholder
elections prohibited); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (holding that a state is
prohibited from refusing military personnel based in a state from voting in state elections).
94. Chief Justice Rehnquist states, "If we are to respect the legislature's Article It
powers, therefore, we must ensure that postelection state-court actions do not frustrate the
legislative desire .. " Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 113 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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power flowing up from the people through the states. 95 That, however, is

what the Supreme Court has been suggesting to us in the recent cases on
federalism. 6 Unless the circumstances suggest a different conclusion,
[a]s a general rule, this Court defers to a state court's

interpretation of a state statute. But in the case of a law
enacted by a state legislature applicable not only to elections to
state offices, but also to the selection of Presidential electors,
the legislature is not acting solely under the authority given it by
the people of the State, but by virtue of a direct grant of
authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States
Constitution. 97
The effect of this is clear enough to the dissenting Justices. 98 In Bush
H, the Chief Justice suggests the possibility that federal courts may
95. Justice Thomas himself reminds us that "[t]he ultimate source of the
Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each individual State, not the
consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole." U.S. Term Limits, Inc.
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). At least within academia,
something like the original split in the Constitutional Convention between those favoring
a state-based federal union modified by the political settlement produced by the Civil
War, and those favoring a strong central government, remains as sharp as ever. For a
flavor of this split, see Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founder's
Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484 (1987); Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms,Similar
Flaws: ConstructingA New Approach to Federalismin Congressand the Court, 14 YALE J.
ON REG. 187 (1996); Daniel Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay
on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH L. REV. 615 (1995);
Charles Fried, Federalism-- Why Should We Care?,6 HARV. J.L. & PUB.POL'Y (1982).
96. This has been especially apparent in recent cases attempting to limit the reach of
the federal Commerce Power. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995)
(determining that the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 exceeded federal
power). It has also been prominent in cases dealing with federal interference with state
governance. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144,149 (1992) (finding federal
interference with state waste disposal sites unconstitutional); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 902, 935 (1997) (involving imposition on states through the Gun Control Act of
1968).
97. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70,76 (2000) (per curium).
98. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 148-49 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer complains:
The Chief Justice contends that our opinion in [Bush I], in which we stated that
"a legislative wish to take advantage of [§ 5] would counsel against" a
construction of Florida law that Congress might deem to be a change in law, now

means that this Court "must ensure that postelection state-court actions do not
frustrate the legislative desire to attain the 'safe harbor' provided by § 5."
However, § 5 is part of the rules that govern Congress' recognition of slates of
electors. Nowhere in Bush I did we establish that this Court had the authority to
enforce § 5. Nor did we suggest that the permissive "counsel against" could be
transformed into the mandatory "must ensure." And nowhere did we intimate,
as the concurrence does here, that a state-court decision that threatens the safe
harbor provision of § 5 does so in violation of Article 11. The concurrence's logic
turns the presumption that legislatures would wish to take advantage of § 5's

2002]

Re-Conceiving JudicialAuthority After Bush v. Gore

1087

consider issues of state separation of powers, without regard to the
provisions of the state constitution, where an arguable connection to the
federal constitution can be discerned. 99 The promise annunciated in U.S.
Term Limits, through the broad reading of McCulloch," is fulfilled in
Bush H. The architects of that victory are those who were most vocal in
their opposition to the jurisprudence that they subsequently extended in
Bush II.
The Bush II decision continues a trend that has resulted in the
transformation of federalism from a system based on limited
governmental power being ceded upwards from the states to a system
where governmental power is vested in states only by act of the
institutions and at the sufferance of the institutions of the national
government. Bush I suggested that the state legislative power could be
exalted over any restraints in state constitutions as long as there was a
federal constitutional hook on which to base that authority. ' 2 Thus, the
Supreme Court has created a basis, in future application, for the
authority of the federal government to remake the political organization
of states, as it sees fit, as long as it comports with an interpreted
requirement of the federal Constitution. All of this has been
accomplished without the burden of amending the federal Constitution!
"safe harbor" provision into a mandate that trumps other statutory provisions
and overrides the intent that the legislature did express.
Id. (citations omitted); see also id. at 124 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
100. See U.S. Term Limits v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 801-02 (1995). Justice Stevens
took a very broad view of the lessons of McCulloch when he argued that states had no
authority over federal elected officials, in the same way that under McCulloch, the states
had no original power to tax federal entities. Id. at 802. In neither case did such a power
pre-date the Constitution. Id. In no case could a state assert an authority it did not have
at the time it ceded authority to the federal government. Id. at 801-02.
101. For a sampling of academic commentary in this area, see Harry N. Scheiber,
Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism -- An American Tradition: Modern Devolution
Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 227 (1996); John C. Yoo, Sounds of
Sovereignty: Defining Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REv. 27, 29 (1998); Thomas S.
Ulen, Economic and Public-ChoiceForces in Federalism, 6 GEO. MASON U. L. REv. 921
(1998)
102. See Bush I, 531 U.S. at 76. The opinion reads:
As a general rule, this Court defers to a state court's interpretation of a state
statute. But in the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable not only
to elections to state offices, but also to the selection of Presidential electors, the
legislature is not acting solely under the authority given it by the people of the
State, but by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of
the United States Constitution.
Id. As such, the Supreme Court suggested error in the Florida Supreme Court's opinion,
to the extent it might have suggested that the Florida Constitution could circumscribe the
state legislature's federal constitutional authority. Id. at 77.
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Hidden from view, significant change can be effected outside the political
process, while appearing to adhere to principles of republican
governance at the federal level. The Court here, to advance its own
power, adopts a principle of "negative federalism" to rival its negative
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and to parallel its construction of a
principle of "negative federal question." Every institutional arrangement
at the state level is subject to review at the federal level for conformity
with the direct and indirect requirements of the Constitution. The Bush
decisions signal the consolidation of Baker v. Carrand its progeny.0
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, highlights the way in which the actions of
the Bush H majority extend the jurisprudential basis supporting the idea
that the federal government is free to use the Constitution as a limitation
on the power of the states to order themselves in republican forms of
government. 'O Justice Ginsburg explains:

The Chief Justice says that Article II, by providing that state
legislatures shall direct the manner of appointing electors,
authorizes federal superintendence over the relationship
between state courts and state legislatures, and licenses a
departure from the usual deference we give to state-court
interpretations of state law.

. .

.

The Framers of our

Constitution, however, understood that in a republican
government, the judiciary would construe the legislature's
enactments. See U.S. Const., Art. III; The Federalist No. 78 (A.
Hamilton). In light of the constitutional guarantee to States of
a "Republican Form of Government," U.S. Const., Art. IV, §4,
Article II can hardly be read to invite this Court to disrupt a
State's republican regime. Yet the Chief Justice today would
reach out to do just that. By holding that Article II requires our
revision of a state court's construction of state laws in order to
protect one organ of the State from another, The Chief Justice
contradicts the basic principle that a State may organize itself as
it sees fit.' 5
It is clear enough under this reading that, whatever the rhetoric of the
Chief Justice and others in defense of state sovereignty may be in other
cases, where it is necessary, the Chief Justice is willing to sacrifice his
principles along with the sovereign authority of the states. 10
103. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
104. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 141-42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106. An interesting case for comparison is US. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
779 (1995). In Bush II, the Chief Justice, along with Justices Thomas, O'Connor and
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Relying on judicial construction of an earlier era, the Chief Justice
obliquely suggests that the eighteenth century delegates to the
Constitutional Convention conceived an Article I creating severe

limitations on the sovereign authority of states to order their own
governments.' °

While this seems odd, suggesting this construction on

textualist grounds is perhaps worse. Textualist interpretation, as utilized
in the Bush decisions, brings to mind both the construction of
"necessary" in McCulloch v. Maryland,1" and President Clinton's
interpretive bravado during his deposition when he sought clarification
on what the meaning of "is" is.10 It suggests a translation of text to suit
modem sensibilities that is the hallmark of the progressive schools of
constitutional interpretation usually vilified by textualists. It amounts to

the kind of lawmaking that poses as interpretation that the Chief Justice
found so distasteful when practiced by the Florida Supreme Court." °

Scalia took the opposite approach as they had in U.S. Term Limits. See id. at 845
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Did these Justices use Bush 1H to repudiate their jurisprudence in
U.S. Term Limits?
107. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 112-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (discussing McPherson
v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892)). Justice Stevens reminds the Chief Justice that partial
quotes run the ethical risk of misleading the reader. Id. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, correctly reminds the Chief Justice that the "Framers of our
Constitution, however, understood that in a republican government, the judiciary would
construe the legislature's enactments." Id. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing T-rE
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton)).
108. Chief Justice Marshall explains:
The word "necessary".. . has not a fixed character, peculiar to itself. It admits of
all degrees of comparison; and is often connected with other words, which
increase or diminish the impression the mind receives of the urgency it imports.
A thing may be necessary, very necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,414 (1819).
109. "It depends on what the meaning of the word 'is' is. If 'is' means is and never has
been, that is one thing. If it means there is none, that was a completely true statement."
William Clinton, video-taped grand jury testimony, August 17, 1998, in Thomas Hargrove,
Key Quotes From Clinton's Presidency, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, January 11,
2001, available in LEXIS/NEXIS, News Lib. President Clinton, of course, was severely
criticized for attempting what law professors have found so elegant in the hands of the
now venerated John Marshall. It seems that context, and the politics of veneration, may
be important indeed.
110. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 114-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). It should not have
taken Justice Breyer's dissent to remind the Chief Justice and his allies on the bench that
questions relating to the election of the President under state procedures are political
questions, and that they are appropriately left to the Congress or President. This decision
was really more in the spirit of politics than the sort of judging the Chief Justice aspires to
as his legacy. Id. at 153-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 142 n.2 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Justice Breyer attempts to resuscitate the old states' rights jurisprudence of
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849) - a jurisprudence clearly now of a bygone age
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Here, in the concurrence to Bush H is McCulloch v. Maryland presented
as a perversion."' This argument was clearly unnecessary. The Equal
Protection intrusion on the ordering of state government, carried over
from the election cases of the Warren Court, proved sufficient for
purposes of securing a majority in Bush H."2 However, the Chief
Justice's concurrence in Bush H meant to go farther than the Equal
Protection jurisprudence of the election cases would seem to permit.113
The Chief Justice, however reluctantly, appears to take on the
character of those who his jurisprudence most despises by assuming a
theatrical pose - that of a passive yet necessary activism. 1 14 He asserts
that "there are a few exceptional cases in which the Constitution imposes
a duty or confers a power on a particular branch of a State's
government.'. 5 Despite protests to the contrary,' 6 the Chief Justice has
and a different sort of political union, one now driven by the political conceptions of the
political actors that the current Chief Justice represents.
111. It may be true that the power to elect, like the power to tax, "involves the power
to destroy." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 431 (1819). Even so, the
power to elect is in the states, and the power to destroy is in the body to which the election
is directed. Thus, "the magic of the word confidence" may not provide the necessary
quantum of skill to ensure that its deployment does not "carry it to the excess of
destruction... [that] would banish that confidence which is essential to all government."
Id. Still, as Americans have learned since 1789, a little political perversion may not be a
bad thing, especially where the perversion of one age becomes acceptable in the next.
Compare Plessy v. Fergusen, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896), with Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347
U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
112. The per curiam opinion in Bush II was limited only to the equal protection
question in which five justices joined. The Chief Justice's concurrence was joined by
Justices Scalia and Thomas. It is curious that Justice O'Connor did not join in the
concurrence. It is possible that she preferred to remain officially uncommitted and
unrestrained for future cases. That sort of conduct accords with her judging style. In an
attempt to remain true to his concurrence in US Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, Justice
Kennedy joined the per curiam in Bush I and declined to join the Chief Justice's
concurrence. Justice Kennedy emphasized in US. Term Limits his willingness to protect
federal rights that he deemed unique - even if lodged within states. Id. at 838-45
(Kennedy, J.,
concurring). However, he emphasized the importance of protecting states
against federal incursions. Id. at 841 (Kennedy, J., concurring). It might well be that the
Chief Justice's concurrence constituted the approval of a federal incursion too great for
Justice Kennedy.
113. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 111-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Chief Justice and his allies suggest
that the Supreme Court must intervene when an issue is important, but to "[c]ount first,
and rule upon legality afterwards, is not a recipe for producing election results that have
the public acceptance democratic stability requires." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046, 1047
(2000) (application for stay) (Scalia, J., concurring). The per curiam in Bush 11 suggests
that "[w]hen contending parties invoke the process of the courts," the Supreme Court
must act as referee. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 111. The Chief Justice claims that because the
Supreme Court considers an issue, it must act. See id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)
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made it possible for others, at their leisure, to find within the arcana and
lacunae of the Constitution other places from 'which it can be divined
that states were meant to be limited or controlled. Here again, the hint
of what is to come is found in US. Term Limits, now in the control of the
traditionalists on the Court, a stretching of the language of Hamilton's

nationalist advocacy to suit the needs of federal supremacy.'17
IV. Sul GENERIS?

It is easy enough to indulge a temptation and to dismiss the arguments

presented in this article.

Many will embrace the uniqueness of the

context in which the Bush cases arose.

The Court states, "Our

consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many
("We must ensure that postelection state-court actions do not frustrate the legislative
desire to attain the 'safe-harbor' provided by § 5."). It is ironic to hear Justice Breyer, in a
voice reminiscent of Justice Scalia in Employment Division, Department of Human
Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), remind the Chief Justice and his colleagues:
Of course, the selection of the President is of fundamental national importance.
But that importance is political, not legal. And this Court should resist the
temptation unnecessarily to resolve tangential legal disputes, where doing so
threatens to determine the outcome of the election.
Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court itself, however, has created a strong
pattern of intervention in political, moral, social, and economic affairs when it has suited
the Court. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664-65 (1966); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996); Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 334 (1890); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116 (1973); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
261 (1964); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767-68 (1978); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S.
652, 654 (1990); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 492 (1999). Though it has on occasion
repudiated earlier interventions, it has never repudiated the power to intervene. Thus, the
Chief Justice merely mimics his jurisprudential forebearers, though he has spent a lifetime
criticizing them. What makes the Chief Justice's efforts stand out in this case is the effect
of the mimicry. Here mimicry takes the Supreme Court beyond anything it had attempted
or intimated before. The opinions in this case, when added to the others, advances the
idea of judicial intervention and provides a basis for changing the relation between the
institutions of our national government, on the one hand, and between the institutions of
our state and national governments on the other.
116. See infra Part IV.
117. Justice Stevens looked to McCulloch, Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122, 193 (1819), and FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) to suggest that,
like the Seventh Amendment, the Constitution as a whole has frozen in time the rights
secured thereby. US. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 801. In particular, Hamilton suggested
that the Constitution guaranteed to states only those powers understood to be exercisable
by states at the time of the ramification of the Constitution. Id. Moreover, the federal
government was not dependent for its existence on the states, but gained its legitimacy
directly from the people of the several states. Id.
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complexities." Thus the Court appears to signal that these cases must be
limited to their facts. 11 But the Supreme Court has hardly ever meant
what it says, especially when the Court appears to regulate the future use
of its decisions. But let us take this position seriously for a moment.
Accepting this position suggests that every important decision is likewise
unique and thus incapable of being applied in other circumstances.'

9

This means that there must exist special rules and special constitutional
interpretations for elections and for any other exceptional matter. It also
suggests that another set of rules necessarily governs all other ordinary

cases. But this suggestion is at variance with traditional notions of stare
decisis 202 and the effect of judicial decisions in our federal common law

system.

1

118. Bush I1,
531 U.S. at 109. "We deal here not with an ordinary election, but with an
election for the President of the United States." Id. at 1.12 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Yet, to suggest that Presidential elections are special in the opinion of this Court because
the Justices believe the office of the Presidency is important is, in the absence of a
constitutional provision to amend the constitutional framework in a way that would
amount to the sort of lawmaking that the Court condemned in Bush I as beyond the
powers of a court - even a supreme court. To suggest that the Supreme Court is different
suggests an unsavory and ultra vires assertion of power for which a constitutional
amendment is appropriate. Justice Breyer states, "I fear that in order to bring this
agonizingly long election process to a definitive conclusion, we have not adequately
attended to that necessary 'check upon our own exercise of power,' 'our own sense of selfrestraint."' Id. at 158 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1,
79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting)).
119. Indeed, this suggestion is at the heart of the approach of at least one current
member of the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor, in particular, has been an outspoken
adherent of a technique of judicial interpretation designed to provide maximum flexibility
to the court and minimum guidance to the populace, especially in matters of constitutional
interpretation. See Larry Cat6i Backer, The Incarnate Word, That Old Rugged Cross and
the State: On the Supreme Court's October 1994 Term Establishment Clause Cases and the
Persistenceof Comic Absurdity as Jurisprudence,31 TULSA L. J. 447 (1996) (examining the
manner in which this interpretative process has been used).
Well, okay, what can provide the answer for Justice O'Connor? That, too, is
easy, if somewhat Olympian. Line drawing, she says, will do the trick. It's line
drawing that provides our answer, line drawing "based on the peculiar facts of
each case." This requires the kind of refined, impressionistic weighing and
balancing that only judges, constrained by cultural norms, can apparently apply.
"[D]ecision[s must] reflect.., the need to rely on careful judgment -- not simple
categories -- when two principles, of equal historical and jurisprudential
pedigree, come into unavoidable conflict."
Id. at 460 (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S.
819, 849 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
120. In the so-called joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), the
Justices attempted to crystalize the idea of stare decisis in a way that both provided for
the necessity of following precedent and its understanding of the broad effect of
fundamental constitutional interpretations. Where, in the performance of its judicial
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Moreover, at its extreme this viewpoint suggests that the Supreme
Court, alone among the branches of government and within the matrix of
the American federal system, has the authority to determine what
constitutes an exception. In that context, only the Supreme Court has
the power to give or to withhold it's imprimatur-post facto-to any
action under color of law. The Court's law extends only as far and as
long as the Court determines only the Court can divulge the meaning and
application of the arcana of constitutional law on a case-by-case basis.
Yet, such a position runs counter to the interpretation and legislation
doctrine the Supreme Court was at pains to craft. Under this reading,
the Supreme Court would have crafted a doctrine of legislative

supremacy that trumps even its own interpretive power.

If the Chief

Justice's new doctrine applies to all courts except the Supreme Court,
then the Chief Justice means to take the question of separation of powers

duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive
controversy reflected in Roe v. Wade, and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a
dimension that the resolution of the normal case does not carry. It is the dimension
present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides
of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate
rooted in the Constitution. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846-47. Justice Scalia scorned this approach
when it came to the political result in Casey, upholding the fundamental liberty of women
to terminate their pregnancies under certain circumstances. See id. at 983 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (mocking the joint opinion's discussion by suggesting that stare decisis is
inapplicable if the original decision was "plainly wrong"). On the other hand, Justice
Scalia has waxed eloquent on the virtues of stare decisis of questionably decided cases that
appear to be more in line with his legislative agenda. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The joint opinion stated that this sort of
crisis-based norm-setting had occurred only twice in recent memory: Brown and Roe.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 863-64. The joint opinion reads its own logic too narrowly in this
respect. Both Brown and Roe stand as representative cases: one for resolution of the
extent of personal autonomy liberties and the other for the nature of institutional
participation in the race question. Adherence to those cases in the sense of the joint
opinion requires elevation of their doctrine to constitutional status of equivalent dignity to
constitutional text. That is the essential point of that part of the joint opinion. See id. As
such, those norm setting opinions cast a net of stare decisis far exceeding the narrow
reaches of their particularized holdings. In this sense, Bush H follows, if in a perverted
way, the precedent of the race cases, exemplified by Brown. See infra Part V. It thus
serves, in its own right, as a part of the interpretive base of the constitutional text
significantly broader than its mere technical holding. In this sense, and in this context, the
sui generis argument of the Chief Justice makes little sense.
121. Justice Ginsburg reminds her colleagues that "[tihe extraordinary setting of this
case has obscured the ordinary principle that dictates its proper resolution: Federal courts
defer to state high courts' interpretations of their state's own law." Bush H, 531 U.S. at
142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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within the federal government to a new level of confusion or
usurpation.' 22
Alternatively, this viewpoint suggests that it is for the national
Supreme Court, and no other, to determine when or whether its rules
will have any effect. At one extreme, it suggests a civil law approach to
the function of the judiciary. Indeed, the Chief Justice's concurrence in
Bush H suggests a civil law approach to statutory and constitutional
interpretation. The idea of interpretation as lawmaking, and judicial
lawmaking as non-judicial action, echoes a generalized, though flawed
understanding of the limitations of courts in civil law jurisdictions.'13 At
the other extreme, it suggests a form of judicial capriciousness that, in
other contexts, might be deemed so arbitrary as to violate settled notions
of due process.12 This is a political arbitrariness couched in the language
122. For a discussion of traditional separation of powers doctrine in federal
constitutional law, see Steven Calabresi & Kevin Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, PluralJudiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Donald Elliott, Why
Our Separation of Powers Jurisprudence Is So Abysmal, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506
(1989).
123. Indeed, Justice Scalia has made no secret of his view, which sadly is the product of
a flawed understanding of the working of civil law systems, that judicial lawmaking is
somehow wrong and certainly non-judicial. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Common Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of the United States Federal Courts in Interpreting
the Constitutionand Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW 3, 25-29 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). This is not the place to discuss the
pathologies of that Justice's error, and from an American originalist perspective, heresy.
But see George E. Bushnell, The Warren Court and the Legal Profession:Shouldering the
Responsibility of a Common Law Legal System, in THE WARREN COURT: A
RETROSPECTIVE 285 (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996). For an elegant description of the
realities of civil law judging in France, see Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser, Judicial (Self-)
Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE L.J. 1325 (1995);
Mitchel de S.-O.-l'E. Lasser, "Lit. Theory" Put to the Test: A Comparative Literary
Analysis of American Judicial Tests and FrenchJudicial Discourse,111 HARV. L. REV. 689
(1998); see also F.L. Morton, JudicialReview in France.A ComparativeAnalysis, 36 AM. J.
COMP. L. 89 (1990). For a description of the nature of the approach to interpretation of
the German federal Constitutional Court, see SABINE MICHALOWSKI & LORNA WOODS,
GERMAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE PROTECTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES (1999);
DONALD P.

KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE

OF THE FEDERAL

REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1989). For a discussion of the German Basic Law, see Donald
P. Kommers, The Basic Law: A Fifty Year Assessment, 53 SMUL REV. 477 (2000).
124. The Supreme Court has made much of this form of capriciousness, at least when
exercised by (now inferior) state courts. The judicial enactment of a new law of punitive
damages, under the guise of interpreting the constitutional guarantees of due process
limitations provides a case in point. See, e.g., BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S.
559 (1996) (noting that awarding punitive damages in that case was arbitrary under
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause). While the majority imposed a three-part
test on state courts for adhering to the new federal constitutional standards for punitive
damages under state law, Justice Breyer's concurrence suggested the procedural defects in
judicial review of punitive damages awards in Alabama. Id. at 574-76, 586-97 (Breyer, J.,
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of the fine distinctions of constitutional law, which ultimately indicates
both decadence and irrelevance. 1"
The consequence of the "this is special" argument is the sort of
cynicism that leads to a questioning of the Supreme Court's authority to
substantially extend the reach of its authority.' 6 As Justice Harlan noted
in another context, "[a] decision of this Court which radically departs
from [the traditions of the nation] could not long survive." '27 The Chief
Justice and those standing with him appear vaguely indifferent in this
regard."" The dissenters at least recognize the danger for the Supreme
Court. With more hope than certainty, Justice Breyer worries that
concurring). As an interesting side point, both Justices Scalia and Ginsburg dissented in
BMW because of their concerns with the intrusiveness of the decision into matters of state
law. See id. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). In Bush II,
Justice Ginsburg alludes to the ordinary constitutionally-suspect capriciousness of the per
curiam decision.
Justice Ginsburg states that "the Court's conclusion that a
constitutionally adequate recount is impractical is a prophecy the Court's own judgment
will not allow to be tested. Such an untested prophecy should not decide the Presidency of
the United States." Bush II, 531 U.S. at 144 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
125. See generally Larry Catd Backer, Disciplining Judicial Interpretation of
Fundamental Rights: First Amendment Decadence in Southworth and Boy Scouts of
America and EuropeanAlternatives, 36 TULSA L.J. 117 (2000). For a recent review of the
madness of this method in the area of criminal law, see Norman J. Fry, Note: Lamprecht v.
FCC: A Looking Glass Into the Future of Affirmative Action?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1895 (1993).
Through some 35 decisions over the next 30 years, the Court found itself
constantly reviewing case-by-case circumstances with slightly different factual
twists because the "totality of the circumstances" test simply failed to give lower
courts, executives, or legislatures clear guidance as to what would, and would
not, pass constitutional muster.
Id. at 1900 n.33 (referring to the use of Due Process Clause to determine whether
confessions are involuntary and thus violate due process).
126. Whatever the rule of law with respect to the power of a court, judicial authority is
never given, it is earned. Judicial authority can also be lost. See Larry Cat6 Backer,
Chroniclers in the Field of Cultural Production: Interpretive Process, 20 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 291 (2000).
[T]he juridical serves as an important site for the production and affirmation of
culture. Courts are the great vehicle for the institutionalization of cultural
aesthetics on a perpetually grand scale. Courts speak authoritatively only in this
sense, but the authority of the juridical in this enterprise of cultural aesthetics is
both messy and complex. Society listens and learns because - and only when - it
chooses to do so. Society internalizes what it hears to the extent it feels it must.
The dynamics of this relationship between speaker and audience is deeply
ingrained within ancient cultural patterns of the aesthetics of authoritative voice.
To understand the function of law, one must first understand the cultural basis of
juridical authority.
Id. at 293.
127. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
128. The per curiam opinion expresses regret for its decision in an odd way:
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in this highly politicized matter, the appearance of a split
decision runs the risk of undermining the public's confidence in
the Court itself. That confidence is a public treasure. It has
been built slowly over many years, some of which were marked
by a Civil War and the tragedy of segregation. It is a vitally
necessary ingredient of any successful effort to protect basic
liberty and, indeed, the rule of law itself. We run no risk of
returning to the days when a President (responding to this
Court's efforts to protect the Cherokee Indians) might have
said, "John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce
it!" But we do risk a self-inflicted wound-a wound that may
harm not just the Court, but the Nation.2 9
Yet I have suggested that it is not the split decision that forms the basis
of the danger for the Supreme Court, but the nature of its
pronouncement. Justice Stevens, however, is more to the point. He
suggests that the decision in Bush II "can only lend credence to the most
cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the land."'
Ironically, the assertion of authority by the Supreme Court in Bush I and
Bush II might provide a principled basis for future application of the
Supreme Court's new doctrine of lawmaking as an extra-judicial act and
may invalidate the actions of the Supreme Court itself. The decision in
Bush II, at least with respect to this teaching, will not be easy to confine
to the narrow facts of that case.
V. THE RACE QUESTION
There is another reason the sui generis argument rings false: race. The
Bush cases are as much about the jurisprudence of racial revenge as they
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the
Members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the Constitution's
design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their
legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending parties invoke the
process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to resolve
the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced to
confront.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curium). A psychologist or linguist might note
a bit of a self-satisfied passive-aggressive stance in those words. They suggest the
rattlesnake, lying peacefully enough under a rock, that must strike when disturbed. But
some might remind the court that its role is not that of the neurotic parent in the
American political family striking out in all directions when its power is invoked by those
seeking to use the power of the parent.
129. Id. at 157-58 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
130. Id. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens might well have recoiled in
horror from the implications of this statement, for himself and the Court, by offering the
hope that "[t]ime will one day heal the wound [that was] inflicted by today's decision." Id.
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might be about the regulation of the election of the President. Their
lessons in that regard are both drawn from, and now constitute a part of,

a growing jurisprudence in which the structure of government, the nature
of our federal system, the scope of fundamental rights, the constitutions
of state governments, and the structure of the state are all maneuvered

like chess pieces in an infinitely complicated game of race-caste politics.
Their lessons will be used and manipulated for the benefit of players on
all sides in the socio-political racial and ethnic battles yet to come. The
loser, as always, will be the Republic, or at least its ideal as lived. Its
structure and character is distorted again and again in the service of the
race warriors for whom this Republic is a battleground. In a larger sense,
the jurisprudential detritus of Bush v. Gore - the continued dismantling

of the original federal system and the development of a foundation for
parliamentary supremacy at the national level through the creation of the
interpretation and legislation binary-is a monument to another great
battle in this nation's long and unfinished race war. This should distress
us all.

At first blush, these conclusions may appear astonishing. One can
almost hear many in the Academy groan "Not again!" on the way to
consigning the arguments to the trash heap of dangerous or disruptive
ideas. "' Surely, one can argue that the protagonists in this drama had far
more important things on their mind than race. 3 ' Race and ethnicity

were not directly an issue in the case; indeed, race and ethnicity were not
even an indirect issue.'33 Besides, many might argue that not everything
131. For a discussion of the uses and regulation of scholarship focusing critically on the
race or ethnicity questions, see Larry Catd Backer, Measuringthe Penetrationof Outsider
Scholarship in the Courts: Indifference, Hostility, Engagement, 33 U.C. DAVis L. REV.
1173 (2000).
Suppression occurs by those time honored methods of social and cultural control
- shunning and demonization. To the extent that outsider scholarship can be
painlessly co-opted, controlled or radicalized, it can play a useful role in defense
of the disciplining of dominant discourse. The courts appear to engage in a
healthy dose of demonization - radical feminists, multiculturalists, and particular
writers suffer most publicly in this regard. Rejectionist and separatist discourse,
served up in a highly demonized form, can be used to scare and intimidate
dominant group elites seeking dialogue.
Id. at 1214 (citations omitted).
132. Here again, our ears should be ringing with the Chief Justice's pronouncement:
"We deal here not with an ordinary election, but with an election for the President of the
United States." Bush 1I, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
133. Yet, this is not entirely true. Discrepancies in voting and vote counting appeared
to occur disproportionately in areas with high immigrant, aged, and non-majority race
populations. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, A Place at the Table: Bush v. Gore Through the
Lens of Race, 29 FLA. ST. L. REV. 496 (2001) (citing U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
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that happens in the United States is touched by the race question.'
Indeed, those who find this sort of argument ludicrous might continue by
saying that race is a stranger to basic questions of the fundamental
character of governmental structure in our federal system-at least since
the three-fifths rule was purged from the Constitution after the Civil War
and the emancipation of the slaves.'35
Yet, recent scholarship has begun to demonstrate the way in which the
race question has had an important effect in shaping of the very core
socio-political norms that distinguish us as a nation. Domestic questions
of race were intimately intertwined with issues of foreign policy after the
Second World War. 6 It has been argued that federal judicial
intervention in state criminal law, and in the construction of a modern
federal jurisprudence of criminal procedure applicable to the federal and
state governments, is directly related to the treatment of AfricanAmerican criminal defendants in the twentieth century South.'37 It has

2
(2001)).
134. This is arguably more appropriately characterized as a voting rights case, one
focused on the indirect preservation of the republican character of the states through a
finely tuned application of principles derived from the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g.,
U.S. CONST. Art I, § 2; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders,
376 U.S. 1, 8 n.10 (1964).
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. There were, of course, a number of other core
provisions, structural and substantive, meant to incorporate the race caste system into the
basic law of the United States. For a discussion, see PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND
THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 1-33 (1996).
VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

136. See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE
IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 205-06 (2000). Professor Dudziak argues that the

federal government's efforts in fostering progress in civil rights was substantially a
function of the needs of American Cold War foreign policy. The Cold War and
considerations of foreign policy both facilitated and limited the character and nature of
civil rights progress after the Second World War. Thus, the need to impress foreigners,
and especially Third-World foreign governments of color, resulted in a civil rights agenda
in which pride of place was given to appearances and formalist progress.
137. See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99
MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000). Professor Klarman contends:
[T]he linkage between the birth of modern criminal procedure and southern
black defendants is no fortuity. For the Court to assume the function of
superintending the state criminal process required a departure from a century
and a half of tradition and legal precedent, both grounded in federalism
concerns. The Justices were not prepared to embark on such a novel enterprise
in cases of marginal unfairness - where the police had interrogated a suspect a bit
too vigorously or permitted defense counsel a little less time than optimal for
preparing a case. On the contrary, the Court was willing to take this leap only
when confronted with cases in which defendants were brutally tortured into
confessing or the appointment of defense counsel in a capital case was a
complete sham. Such flagrant injustices were not frequent occurrences in the
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been said that much of the history of the Supreme Court and its
transformation "from tax collector and federal jailer to superintendent of
the nation's aspirations for social justice" is little more than the history of
the consequences of race for domestic and foreign policy. 38
Race, directly or indirectly, has touched much of the Supreme Court's
participation in the establishment of the dominant position of the
national government during the twentieth century. Much of that political
restructuring has been race positive. The changes in the scope of the
federal commerce power 39 and the taxing and spending powers1'4 after
the Second World War provide fairly well-known examples. The
contests over recognition of a host of liberties in the twentieth century,14 '
including the right to vote, 42 have been similarly touched.

United States during the 1920s and 1930s - except in the South, in cases involving
black defendants charged with serious interracial crimes, usually rape or murder.
Id. at 48-49.
138. Dennis J. Hutchinson, A Century of Social Reform The Judicial Role, 4 GREEN
BAG 2D 157 (2001).
139. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (holding that a
federal public accommodations statute was within Congress' Commerce Power);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304-05 (1964) (holding that a federal public
accommodations statute was within Congress' Commerce Power when applied to
restaurants).
140. Ironically, a number of cases interpreting the federal authority in the contest of
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children Program did much to establish a broad
federal authority in the contest of federal programs. See, e.g., Carlson v. Remillard, 406
U.S. 598, 604 (1972) (voiding state rules that denied benefits to the family of a soldier
serving in Vietnam because they conflicted with court-interpreted federal welfare
eligibility rules); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291 (1971) (determining that states
had no power to vary the terms of optional programs under federal welfare legislation);
King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968) (interpreting federal welfare rules to preclude
Alabama from denying welfare benefits to otherwise eligible children because their
mother cohabitates with a man not obligated to support the children).
141. Among these liberties are the right to travel, to marry, and to procreate. See
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 510-11 (1999) (holding that the privileges and immunities
clause of Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of new citizens to treatment equal to
that of older residents); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (constitutionalizing the
right to interracial marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (subjecting
statutes providing for sterilization of criminals to strict scrutiny). Though Skinner and
Saenz were not overtly race-based cases, the racial undertones of both cases were well
known.
142. Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 622, 633 (1969) (holding that
school district elections may not be limited to property owners); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (invalidating poll taxes). Though both cases opened
the franchise to the poor in general, both had a significant effect on people of color who
were disproportionately represented among the poor.
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Yet, the effects of race on the structure of our political institutions are
not always directed in race-positive directions. 43 Indeed, many contests
over the scope of constitutional protections at the federal level tinge with
race and ethnicity. The battles over the establishment of constitutional
guarantees of social benefits'" and establishment of a right to equal
education' 45 are reminders that resistance to structural changes grounded
on general principles of governance, like those seeking a race positive
result, also mask the ways in which principle serves as a proxy for
conflicts over ethno-racial hierarchy. Even race-positive changes to the
basic structure of our federal governmental system have required
sacrifices; change has required an offering of the bodies of the oppressed
for the delectation of those with the power to effect change.' 46 Looking
143. The elevation of the principle of separate but equal in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896) and the evisceration of the meaning of the privileges and
immunities clauses of Art. IV and the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution
in The Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) provide spectacular examples
of race-negative uses of structural theory and the federal-state relationship. In the
twentieth century, the cases regulating race and ethnicity-based gerrymandering provide a
recent set of examples. See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 903 (1995); United States v.
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 739 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633-34 (1993). Affirmative
action has a structural component as well. The passage of Proposition 187 in California
and the efforts to strike it down on federal grounds suggest another generalizable
structural component.
144. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 472 (1970). The race and gender sub-texts
in debates over social welfare programs are well known. See generally, JILL QUADAGNO,
THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994);
MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE

WAR ON WELFARE (1989); Larry Cat6 Backer, The Many Faces of Hegemony: Patriarchy

and Welfare as a Women's Issue (reviewing MIMI

ABRAMOVITZ, UNDER ATTACK,
FIGHTING BACK: WOMEN AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES (1996)), 92 Nw. U.L.

REV. 327 (1997).
145. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
The Court stated, "Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit
protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is
implicitly so protected." Id. at 35. In this case, the disproportionately burdened district
had a ninety percent Mexican-American and six percent African-American enrollment.
The wealthiest district had a non-Hispanic white population of over eighty percent. Id. at
12-13.
146. See Larry Cat6 Backer, Culturally Significant Speech: Law, Courts, Society and
Racial Equity, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 845 (1999).
Saints and martyrs, to the extent they are constructed as such by a racializing
dominant group, become powerful voices in our cultural conversations. The very
act of death translates these figures and their messages into powerful cultural
speech. The symbols of that speech go to issues of cultural self-conceptions of
fairness. Society's reply to this sort of speech can be considered societal
expiation. Penance and contrition have done more to change the judgment of
the dominant group respecting the magnitude... of the disabilities of race than
almost anything else this century.
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at Bush II through this lens and through this jurisprudential history,
invokes the view Lincoln must have had gazing over the battlefields of
Gettysburg. Lincoln's address assumes an ironic poignancy as one gazes
over the battlefield of Bush II.
The insinuation of race into Bush H's jurisprudence of revenge is most
apparent in the dialogue between the Chief Justice and Justice Ginsburg.
This judicial conversation reveals a jurisprudence of revenge based on
the use of federal judicial power in the race wars of the mid-twentieth
century against the members of the political group deemed responsible
for the decisions and their ethno-racial beneficiaries.
Bush H invoked two great battle sites of the mid-twentieth century
race wars, NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson47 and Bouie v. City of
For Justice Ginsburg, both cases are monuments to a
Columbia.19
unique time in our history when the Supreme Court used itself to control
state high courts as it dismantled the institutional structures designed to
suppress African-American civil rights.' 49 In Patterson, the Supreme
Id. at 861; see also Anthony M. Kennedy, Law and Belief, 34 TRIAL 22, 26 (July 1998)
(noting that the protest actions of people like Rosa Parks "resonate in the American
spirit"). Professor Michael J. Klarman of the University of Virginia School of Law has
evidenced the cycle of sacrifice in the area of criminal procedure jurisprudence. He states:
The landmark criminal procedure cases ... help us to understand this dynamic.
From the Civil War through the civil rights movement, it has been easiest to
mobilize northern white opinion in support of the rights of southern blacks in
response to brutality, violence, and lynching. When southern whites have quietly
segregated or disenfranchised blacks, northern whites often have remained
relatively indifferent. Brutality and violence, though, they sometimes have
refused to countenance.
Klarman, supra note 137, at 96. Of course, during the period at issue, northern states were
busy assimilating and exploiting their own racialized minorities including Irish, Italians,
and Jews. Thus, with a large grain of salt, Professor Klarman's race binary - where north
equals good and south equals bad - works. Cf CARL T. ROWAN, THE COMING RACE
WAR IN AMERICA (1996).
147. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
148. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
149. Professor Angela Harris summarizes:
Following World War II, the Supreme Court also drastically reduced
government power over racial management in the old "social" realm. In a series
of cases concerning voting discrimination, the Court struck down state attempts
to exclude African Americans from political power by "privatizing" the electoral
process. The Court began to find state action when governments colluded with
privately owned companies to provide discriminatory services. The Court
undermined the practice of writing racially restrictive covenants to protect all
white neighborhoods by making them legally unenforceable in Shelley v.
Kraemer and Barrows v. Jackson. The Court restricted the states' ability to
persecute civil rights organizations and civil rights demonstrators in several
important First Amendment cases. Finally, the Court entered the heart of the
"social" realm and held antimiscegenation statutes unconstitutional in Loving v.
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Court gave itself the authority to interpret Alabama law, correcting what
it deemed to be a gross error of interpretation. "0 In the course of the
decision, the Supreme Court solidified the modern contours of the First
Amendment's freedom of association."' In Bouie v. City of Columbia,
the Supreme Court reversed the application of an interpretation of a
state's trespass law by the state's high court; however, it did so on a
prospective basis. 15 2 In reaching each of these decisions, the Court
assumed control of the institutional apparatus of the racial caste system
in the South."3 Justice Ginsburg takes some pains to remind us that:
Patterson,a case decided three months after Cooper v. Aaron,..
. in the face of Southern resistance to the civil rights movement,
held that the Alabama Supreme Court had irregularly applied
its own procedural rules to deny review of a contempt order
against the NAACP arising from its refusal to disclose
membership lists ....
Bouie, stemming from a lunch counter
"sit-in" at the height of the civil rights movement, held that the
South Carolina Supreme Court's construction of its trespass
laws-criminalizing conduct not covered by the text of an
otherwise clear statute-was "unforeseeable" and thus violated
due process when applied retroactively to the petitioners.''

Virginia. White purity was no longer a state interest of constitutional
significance.
Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race
Law, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1923, 1991 (2000) (citations omitted).
150. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 453-57. The Supreme Court determined that the
interpretation of Alabama's procedural rules were so novel that it would be unfair to hold
the current litigants to that interpretation. Id. Justice Ginsburg interpreted the thrust of
that case: "We said that 'our jurisdiction is not defeated if the non-federal ground relied
on by the state court is without fair or substantial support."' Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140
(2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Patterson, 357 U.S. at 455).
151. This case is now cited as important precedent for the establishment of the
contours of the First Amendment's freedom of association. "Similarly in the 1950s and
1960s, free speech became intertwined with another substantive cause that was beginning
to prosper - the Civil Rights Movement. Again, it is no accident that many of the
landmark free speech decisions of the Warren Court emanated from civil rights
controversies." Michael Klarman, Rethinking the History of American Freedom (Review
Essay of ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM (1998), 42 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 265,272 (2000) (citations omitted).
152. 378 U.S. at 349. The Supreme Court held that the interpretation was
unforeseeable and thus violated the due process rights of criminal defendants. Id. at 350,
354-55.
153. See, e.g., Seth P. Waxman, Twins at Birth: Civil Rights and the Role of the Solicitor
General,75 IND. L.J. 1297, 1310-11 (2000)(discussing the narrow approach of Bouie).
154. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
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But to arrive at these important changes in the treatment of AfricanAmerican litigants in the state courts of the old Confederacy, the
Supreme Court had to break new ground. Each decision effectively
treated the state high court like a rogue court and branded the state court
holdings as beyond the judicial power of the courts. Additionally, each
decision represented an unusual judicial intervention using ordinary law
to reimpose the rule of law in a place where it had disappeared. Thus,
fairness principles arising from the need for litigants to be made aware of
their duties and obligations'55 were stretched to redefine the nature of the
republican character of state government.156 The use of instrumentalities
of state government for lawless purposes in the racial war of the states of
the old Confederacy required suppression. The decisions in Patterson
and Bouie were two in a large body of cases that provided a
jurisprudential basis for intervention in the internal affairs of the states in
that context. The pattern was the same as that used to apply principles of
equal protection to forcibly reconstitute the internal organization of the
states.157 Therefore, Justice Ginsburg is right in a narrow sense when she
says that Patterson and Bouie were essentially racial.'58
155. The problems of prospective and retroactive application of judicial
interpretations have a long and inconsistent history. See, e.g., Trevor W. Morrison, Fair
Warning and the RetroactiveJudicial Expansion of FederalCriminal Statutes, 74 S. CAL. L.
REV. 455 (2001); Jill E. Fisch, Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach,
110 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997). The racial focus of Bouie is perhaps best understood by
the fate of the holding subsequent to its issuance, at least before Bush II. Harold J. Krent
explains that "the promise of Bouie has been largely illusory" as "courts have construed
the foreseeability requirement generously" and are inclined to "reverse on Bouie grounds
only when the judicial change seems entirely arbitrary." Harold J. Krent, Should Bouie Be
Buoyed?: Judicial Retroactive Lawmaking and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 3 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 35, 38-39 (1997); Dan M. Kahan, Some Realism About Retroactive
Lawmaking, 3 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 95, 109-10 (1997) ("Against the background
of competing regional norms on racial equality, it is not hard to understand why the
United States Supreme Court found this exercise of retroactive lawmaking unacceptable,
or why the South Carolina Supreme Court did not.").
156. Of course, the Supreme Court could not reach this issue directly. The only
remaining tooth of the political question doctrine appears to be the preclusion of the
Supreme Court from entertaining directly questions relating to the form of state
government. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
157. Id. at 228-37.
158. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 140 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Thus, according to Justice
Ginsburg, Patterson stood merely for the proposition that federal question jurisdiction is
not defeated even where the claim is not vindicated, and Bouie stood for the proposition
that it was unfair in the circumstances to retroactively apply a novel interpretation of a
statute. Id. Both of the cases are limited to their historical and racialized context out of
which broader application is inappropriate. Justice Ginsburg notes:
The Chief Justice's casual citation of these cases might lead one to believe they
are part of a larger collection of cases in which we said that the Constitution
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But, in the Chief Justice's hands, the racial essence of those cases finds
broad application. In the Bush H concurrence, Patterson and Bouie,
cases that are ostensibly sui generis and "embedded in historical contexts
hardly comparable to the situation [in Bush]"'5 9 become the means for

actualizing the authority of the Supreme Court to the limit of its dicta in
Cooper v. Aaron.'6 The Chief Justice frees these cases of their racial
limitations for use in a case that is itself supposed to be limited to its
"unique" context. Each case now becomes the source of principles-the
applications of which leads to a broad restructuring of the relationship
between state and federal courts and to a narrowing of the character of
judicial interpretation. The Chief Justice understands the two cases to
stand for the proposition that state court interpretations that deviate too
sharply from prior understandings of a statute, or appear to deviate from
the plain text of the statute, might be voided as "impermissibly
broaden[ing] the scope of that statute beyond what a fair reading
provided, in violation of due process."'' It is this interpretation that the
Chief Justice applied to the not-so-novel circumstances of Bush H. The
Chief Justice stated "What we would do in the present case is precisely
parallel: Hold that the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Florida election laws impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair
reading required, in violation of Article II."' 62 These decisions are
necessary judicial interventions using ordinary law to regulate the
borders of the rule of law. Thus, fairness principles arising from the need
for litigants to be made aware of their duties and obligations are
stretched to define the nature of the limits of judicial interpretation. This
is another instance of liberal interventionist jurisprudence applied
against its creators by interventionists of a different political stripe. As a
result, the distinction between interpretation and legislation in the
jurisprudence of state courts is born.163

Yet, by generalizing the principles of Patterson and Bouie and by
liberating those cases from their specific historical contexts, Bush II
became as much about the politics of race and ethnicity as were Patterson
impelled us to train a skeptical eye on a state court's portrayal of state law. But
one would be hard pressed, I think, to find additional cases that fit the mold.
Id.
159. Id.
160. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See supra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
161. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
162. Id. Here the Florida Court assumes the character of a rogue court like the courts
disciplined in Patterson and Bouie. Id. The form of roguish behavior in this instance is the
lawless distortion of the judicial function of interpretation.
163. See discussion supra Part I.
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and Bouie. The Justices must have been well aware of the ethnic and
racial core underneath the arguments about the character of federalism
and the limits of judicial interpretation.' 64 At least one amicus brief
described anecdotally the problems of voting within Jewish and other
minority communities in South Florida. 65 The litigation generated
and race.166
significant publicity about the incidence of voting disparities
Opposition to racialization of the election, and its resolution by the
7
of the election. 16
courts, ironically, amplified the racial characterization
Political divisions between communities of color also added fuel to the
fire.TM These questions revolved around the nullification of the franchise
to communities of color and the results transcend the finality of Bush II
in the judicial sphere. Thus, five months after the election, "...
African-American voters in Florida are more likely to view Bush as
164. The Justices, of course, could decline to read an amicus brief or refrain from
reading accounts of the racial and ethnic frustrations that resulted from the way the
franchise was burdened. The Justices might even believe that such frustrations were
delusional or misplaced. But even then, it is hard to imagine that they would be unaware.
165. See Brief of Amici Curiae Disenfranchised Voters in the U.S.A. et al., at 54-55,
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000). Rabbi Yellin expressed
the sentiment of his congregation to the Justices:
The media is totally confused by this, and it is no wonder that the former
Secretary of State, The Honorable James Baker, could hold up a normal
"butterfly," and unconscionably imply that elderly, Jewish, and AfricanAmericans, and Palm Beach County citizens, were "confused" (implying
"stupid"). Mr. Baker was not confused because Bush voters were not confused,
because their candidate was the first on the list, and you could not mistake
punching the Bush "butterfly" hole because it was at the top of the column of
holes.
Id.
166. The Reverend Jesse Jackson was quick to voice the view of the AfricanAmerican community in this respect. See Donald Lambro, Democrats Won't Knock
Jackson, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at Al ("He characterized the large number of
disputed ballots filled out by black voters as 'a bold attempt to take from people their
franchise. . . . I can live under Bush winning, I can't live under Bush stealing").
Investigations after the inauguration of George W. Bush appear to suggest that the
franchise of African-Americans might indeed have been burdened. See John Lantigua,
How the GOP Gamed the System in Florida,THE NATION, Apr. 30, 2001, available at
http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtm?i=20010430&s=lantigua ("In all, some 200,000
Floridians were either not permitted to vote in the November 7 election on questionable
or possibly illegal grounds, or saw their ballots discarded and not counted. A large and
disproportionate number were black.").
167. Mona Charen, Surveying the Damage, AM. ENTERPRISE, Mar. 1, 2001, at 5 ("But
things really got rolling during the post-election campaign, when Gore, Jesse Jackson, and
many members of the Democratic Party manipulated black sensitivities in a grotesque and
unforgivable manner.").
168. See Ramesh Ponnuru, Lefty Nation?, NAT'L REV., Apr. 16, 2001 at Vol. LIII, No.
7 (stating that many believe that "[Cluban-Americans, meanwhile, put Bush over the top
in Florida").
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illegitimate.
In large part, that feeling is because many
African-Americans think their votes were the most affected by faulty
equipment and other problems on Election Day."' 69
A sense of the enduring strength of the racialized characterization of
the proceedings can be gleaned from the continuing effect of the decision
among communities of color outside of Florida. At a hearing regarding a
request for funding in order to renovate the Supreme Court building,
members of the Court were treated to another expression of the
continued strong racial and ethnic understanding of Bush II:
"This past year you broke my heart by getting yourselves
involved in a political issue," Serrano told the justices. Serrano
said
his
Bronx
constituents
are
overwhelmingly
African-Americans and Hispanics and supported Al Gore in
the presidential race. "They're angry and bitter," Serrano said.
Serrano told the justices that blacks compare the court's
decision in favor of George W. Bush to the pre-civil rights
battles in the South. And his Hispanic constituents, Serrano
added, say the ruling reminds them of the political systems in
countries some have fled. "Some of these people feel their
rights have been totally trampled on," Serrano concluded. 7"
The racial repercussions continue to be felt, and additional judicial
action is possible.'
The judicial interventions in Florida and
Washington have merely redirected the racial focus of the election to the
language of the courts rather than the political arena.
Consider some additional ironies in Bush H. Justice Ginsburg argues
that Patterson and Bouie are sui generis, applicable only in the
extraordinary context of the race battles of the last century.' The Chief
Justice disagrees and applies the teaching of those two race cases to
broadly impose a change in the nature of the relationship between state
169. Rafael Lorente, Poll: Most in FloridaSay Bush Legitimate;Ambivalence Prevails
Toward U.S. Supreme Court, News Media, SUN-SENTINEL (FORT LAUDERDALE, FL),
Apr. 13, 2001, at Al.
170. Jonathan Ringel, Justices Ask for $ 110 Mil. in Renovation Funds, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 30,2001, at 4.
171. Nation Investigation Reveals Florida Officials Shut Out Tens of Thousands of
Black Voters on Election Day, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Apr. 12, 2001, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Lib., News file.
A pending NAACP lawsuit charges Secretary of State Harris and other Florida
officials with violating the 14th Amendment and the 1965 Voter Rights Act and
demands many reforms to the Florida electoral system. In its March interim
assessment, the U.S. Civil Rights Commission said it had uncovered evidence
that is likely to lead to "findings of probable discrimination."
Id.
172. Bush v. Gore, 530 U.S. 98,139-41 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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and federal courts. 173 The Chief Justice also uses the cases to significantly
limit the power of judicial interpretation in a case that he argues is sui
generis1 74 Election cases may well be exceptional, yet Bush II
demonstrates once again that race is unexceptional. It continues to serve
as the common lubricant of our public law. Race serves as the catalyst,
or excuse, for transcendent changes to the American federal state.
As ironic as the sui generis argument is, the Chief Justice uses these
early race cases against the beneficiaries of those cases. In the name of
equal protection and the new realities of federalism, Bush II applied
Patterson and Bouie to foreclose Florida's opportunity to recount ballots
that were disproportionately cast by African-American and Jewish
voters."' In preserving the value of the voting franchise, the franchise
itself was made unavailable to those most vulnerable to its loss. For
those who viewed the rise of federal power with horror as a consequence
of racial or ethnic agitation in the twentieth century, there is a delicious
irony in this result.
Bush H is, in part, the house that race built. The race wars of the last
century saw the rise of federal power against the states and the
individual. The original beneficiaries of that power were those whom the
majority had traditionally reduced to second-class status - primarily
racial and ethnic minorities. This century opens with a demonstration of
the powerful tools used by the race warriors of the last century. Like all
tools, they can be used by any group that develops the skills to use them.
Further, the utility of the tools are never limited by their original
Amendment should have taught
purpose. The history of the Fourteenth
176
•
17
7
the American people that lesson. Bush II demonstrates that it has.
173. See id. at 114-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. Leonard Levy noted:
The Court has, in fact, proved itself to be most adept in reading into the
Constitution values and policy preferences that meet its approval, and its
freedom to do so is virtually legislative in scope. As has been remarked so often,
the Court sits as a continuous constitutional convention; its duties are political in
the highest sense as well as judicial. The history of its treatment of the due
process clause is as good an example of this as any....
Leonard W. Levy, Introduction, in CHARLES FAIRMAN & STANLEY MORRISON, THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE INCORPORATION THEORY

xvi (1970). It needs little reminding that this provision was originally meant to target
newly freed slaves and undo the structural constructions of the old regime. See generally
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). The amendment was, however, first
used to exclude the newly freed slaves from a large portion of the benefits of the
provision. See, e.g., Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). It was then used
to construct a theory of the fundamental rights of economic autonomy. See, e.g., Lochner
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The reshaping of the nature and character of the state cannot be
confined to the issue that gave rise to the changes. This presents a real
danger because the tools of emancipation can be given another character
entirely. Bush I confirms the importance and utility of race in the
remaking of the Republic, but it does so with a coldly ironic nod to the
race politics on which it is based.
VI. THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME

Felix Frankfurter once remarked that "[i]f the Thames is 'liquid
history,' the Constitution of the United States is most significantly not a
document but a stream of history. And the Supreme Court has directed

the stream."'78 There is now cause for worry among the complacent, no
matter how much they have worked to make the decisions in Bush I and
Bush H disappear. What had once been a marginalized position taken by

a group of academics, some of whom had been disparagingly
characterized as extremists in the legal academy,'79 has now been
articulated by members of the Supreme Court itself: "Although we may
never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this
year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It
is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the

rule of law."' The Supreme Court has demonstrated, with ironic effect,
that its most conservative elements are capable of acting like the most
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Finally, it was used as a basis for the construction of a
host of individual rights.
177. Thus, for example, the aggressive use of the Equal Protection Clause has proven
in recent years to be a valuable tool for self-styled progressives. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996). The Bush II per curiam opinion is a reminder that the Equal
Protection Clause is also valuable for the purposes of self-styled conservatives. Of course,
there is a presumption hidden in this footnote - the masking of political opinion within the
neutrality of jurisprudential doctrine. But then, cases such as Bush H clearly reveal this
unfortunate practice of many of our Justices. For an attempt to understand the workings
of the politics of jurisprudence, see Larry Cati Backer, Inscribing JudicialPreferencesinto
Our Fundamental Law: On the European Principle of Margins of Appreciation as
ConstitutionalJurisprudence in the US., 7 TULSA COMP. & INT'L LJ. 327 (2000).
178. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY
AND WAITE 2 (1937).
179. See generally DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE
PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1992); GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT:
THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (1993);
RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO CHRONICLES: CONVERSATIONS ABOUT AMERICA
AND RACE (1995); Mark Tushnet, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1988); Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment.
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331

(1988).
180. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128-29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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distinguished adherents of the critical legal studies movement by
translating constitutional text to suit modern times."' What had once
been unthinkable may well be the basis of the political organization of
the United States in the coming century: a federalization based on
devolution of authority from the federal government and a shift of
interpretive authority from the state to the federal courts and ultimately
from the federal courts to the federal legislature. 82
That these transfigurations are being wrought by the hands of those in
the judiciary most loudly professing a respect for the original intent of
the founders is distressing enough 1 3 The fact that those who take the
opposite view also participate in the enterprise of metamorphosis
suggests an unconscious complicity. 8 Therefore, it should come as no
surprise that their opponents, now eager for ideological control, would
use the techniques that had so effectively been used against them in the
past. Thus, the jurisprudence of revenge is an apt characterization of the
hyper-legal jurisprudence of decadence and change. That both camps
pander to the amoral and selfish deeds of those who act as if the
Republic is merely a personal extension of themselves insinuates that the
transformations hinted at by the Bush opinions are irresistible.
The only uncertainty that the future holds is this: into what form will
our federal Republic be transformed in the twenty-first century? The
cases suggest that American federalism is changing. Deference to states
now depends wholly on the largesse of the institutions of the federal

181. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 800-01 (1983) (translating
language of civil rights to support the decision in Brown).
182. Many conservatives have bemoaned the change in the nature of our political
organization from their own perspectives. See Lino A. Graglia, From Federal Union to
National Monolith: Mileposts in the Demise of American Federalism, 16 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 129, 130 (1993). Yet, this transformation is made possible by the activism of
both progressives and traditionalists, each pursuing their own political agendas at the
expense of the other.
183. Among the first rank of these actors within the judicial realm are Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justice Scalia's actions are most ironic in the
context of these cases. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 123, at 25-29.
184. It was, after all, the so-called progressives who first effectively used the courts to
take away from the states the power over their internal governance on the basis of federal
principles. The per curiam opinion in Bush II takes advantage of this by applying the "one
person, one vote" jurisprudence of prior courts to the context of Presidential elections.
The per curiam's use of these "liberal" precedents in a new way suggests the means by
which the Bush II opinions will be used in the future, irrespective of any plea to the

Cf. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE
FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
contrary in those opinions.
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government. The cases further suggest that courts may lose their
ultimate authority over the legislature. This suggests that the common
law system, as the basis of law making in the United States, will
disappear in everything but name.
It is common to believe that change comes only from progressive high
court jurists who espoused the doctrine of a living Constitution.' 5 The
adherents of this view have fashioned a great deal of innovation during
their time of primacy.'" The nation now watches these jurists carefully
and are attuned to any deviation from traditional values."" But the
opponents of progressivism offer little difference."' The jurisprudence of
revenge makes progressives of everyone it touches.
It is important to watch carefully the actions of those who most
vociferously protest adherence to ancient tradition. They, like Octavian
and his followers in an earlier republic, remain at the forefront of
another great transformation of our Republic.' 89 This transformation will
185. I will, at some risk, group within the traditional adherents of this view those
commentators now generally classified as process theorists. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). Robert Bork,
rightly or not, identifies a number of scholars and jurists as members of this camp. See
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 187-221 (1990).
186. See, e.g., THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
1996). For less flattering descriptions of the work of the Warren Court, see BORK, supra

note 185, at 69-100.
187. Among the more popular books at the close of the Twentieth Century were those
of William Bennett. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BENNETT, THE DEATH OF OUTRAGE: BILL
CLINTON AND THE ASSAULT ON AMERICAN IDEALS (1998). Mr. Bennett has been a
significant force in the re-education of American youth and its sensitivity to deviance from
conduct norms. See, e.g., VIRTUES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE: A TREASURY OF GREAT
MORAL STORIES (William J. Bennett ed., 1993); THE MORAL COMPASS: STORIES FOR A
LIFE'S JOURNEY (William J. Bennett ed., 1995). For a less than compassionate review of
this effort, see JOHN KATZ, VIRTUOUS REALITY: How AMERICA SURRENDERED
DISCUSSION OF MORAL VALUES TO OPPORTUNISTS, NITWITS AND BLOCKHEADS LIKE
WILLIAM BENNETT (1997). For a less passionate commentary, see MARTIN E. MARTY,

THE ONE AND THE MANY: AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR THE COMMON GOOD (1997).

188. The late Bernard Schwartz described this similarity well. See generally Bernard
Schwartz, "Brennan v. Rehnquist" - Mirror Images in Constitutional Construction, 19
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 213 (1994). Richard Epstein has made this observation in the
context of the contest over the legitimacy of the judicial review of the 2000 presidential
election results in Florida. See Richard A. Epstein, Undue Restraint.- Why Judicial
Activism Has its Place, NAT'L REV., Dec. 31, 2000, Vol. LI, No. 23, in LEXIS/NEXIS,
News Lib. Applauding the intervention of the courts, whatever the outcome, he suggests
that "[t]he choice is never between restraint and activism; it is, rather, a question of
whether the attack against a piece of legislation makes sense in light of constitutional text
and structure. It is in this light that we should view the debate over the Supreme Court's
role in the Florida controversy." Id.
189. The new scholarship on the transformation of the Roman Republic is instructive.

2002]

Re-Conceiving JudicialAuthority After Bush v. Gore

1111

not come about clumsily' 9 or directly."' The institutions of the Republic
are too strong for that. Rather, transformation will come in the form of

Fundamental change did not receive consideration. A reconstitution of the
social and political structure was unthinkable for nobiles and plebs alike.
Reforms, when they came, were generally piecemeal and unconnected, prompted
by ad hoc situations, often induced by considerations of politics rather than
humanity or justice. . . . In a sense, the most arresting feature of the late
Republic is not lawlessness but an obsession with legalisms. From the time of
Sulla on, a mass of resolutions and statutory law interpreted and reinterpreted
the mos maiorum, setting the context for many of the era's political struggles....
It is fitting and instructive that the bewildering wrangle over Caesar's ratio
absentis and its technical ramifications should have precipitated the civil war
itself. Both sides rested their public case on an allegedly strict interpretation of
Roman law and proprieties. That fact points up all the more markedly the
persistent attention - even when perverted - to constitutional principles and
their interpretation. When a crisis developed, it came not from revolutionary
action but from dispute about and divergence from traditional procedures. The
conventions mattered - they were themselves the agents of tension and conflict
that finally engulfed Rome in Civil War.
ERICH S. GRUEN, THE LAST GENERATION OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 506-07 (1974).
Compare the argument of one of the great advocates of the Republican Party in his
assessment of the nature of the decision of the Florida Supreme Court that was ultimately
overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court. [Its attempt to throw a presidential election by
inventing post facto election law is surely a bridge too far. It begins with the Justices
setting themselves up as defenders of the 'will of the people' against what they
contemptuously call 'hypertechnical reliance upon statutory provisions,' or what other
people call 'adherence to the law.'] Charles Krauthammer, Our Imperial Judiciary; We
Need to Bring a Gavel Down on Arrogant Judges like Florida's Supremes, TIME, Dec. 4,
2000, at 46.
190. For example, the Rev. Jesse Jackson's protests of vote stealing aside, the politics
of vote counting is as old as the Republic. At the close of the 1960 presidential election,
the same was said about the irregularities in voting that produced a Democratic victory in
the key state of Illinois. The popular press was quick to remind Americans of this parallel
and the differences between Nixon's conduct in 1960 and Gore's in 2000. See, e.g., Mike
Robinson, Recount Recalls 1960 Illinois Nixon-Kennedy Race, Fraud Charges,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES/CHATTANOOGA FREE PRESS, Nov. 12,2000, at A9.
Before Florida 2000, there was Illinois 1960 and Republican complaints that
Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley and his Machine had stolen the election for
He was bitter about the fact that the election
Democrat John F. Kennedy ....
was stolen and the evidence was pretty conclusive that it was," says Herb Klein,
who was Nixon's press secretary on the 1960 campaign trail. "There was no
question in his mind that Daley had stolen the election in Illinois.".... Nixon
said Illinois Sen. Everett M. Dirksen urged him not to concede the election,
saying that if he surrendered, ballots and other election records would be quickly
But Nixon, watching
destroyed or lost, making a recount impossible.
developments from a suite at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, decided
that a recount would drag on for months, undermine a Kennedy presidency and
foreign policy as well.... Some political historians have suggested that another
reason Nixon did not challenge the results was that he knew an investigation
might also turn up Republican chicanery in southern Illinois and elsewhere.
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jurisprudential hyper-legalism, where the precedential value of cases is
arbitrarily determined at the whim of politicized jurists' 92 and legitimized
by popular inaction.' 93 Transformation will result by infusing old
constitutions with new meaning. Transformation will be effected using
the tools of the prior age in order to achieve new or more pronounced
effect.
In Bush II, the legacy of the Warren court's structural
constitutional law decisions are apparent. This legacy represents the
Id. It is clear from popular accounts that the possibile existence of a vengeful satisfaction
in knowing that the score is now even in the contest between the political parties over the
course of the last half century. The vote-stealing issue may not disappear. John Sweeney,
the current President of the AFL-CIO, in a speech to the American Association of Law
Schools, characterized the actions of the Republican functionaries in Florida and the
subsequent legal action as illustrative of the type of vote stealing followed by litigation
that has characterized the way in which management interests have increasingly stolen
elections from union organizers. John Sweeney, Speech at the Association of American
Law Schools 2001 Annual Meeting (Jan. 5, 2001).
191. Our security agencies are so highly integrated into civilian society that they play a
significant role in contemporary politics even as each one appeares to eschew such a role.
See, e.g., Dwight D. Eisenhower, Farewell Address, January .17, 1961, available at
http://eisenhower.
utexas.edulfarewell.htm.
192. This involvement is self-conscious and institutionally self-indulgent. See Charles
Lane, Rehnquist: Court Can Preventa Crisis; ChiefJustice Cites 1876 Election Role, WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 2001, at A24.
Just weeks after the controversial Supreme Court decision that ended manual
recounts in Florida's presidential voting - effectively awarding the White House
to George W. Bush - Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist gave a little-noticed
history lecture suggesting that sometimes members of the court may have to
become involved in political matters to prevent a national crisis. Discussing the
role of Supreme Court Justices in a commission that decided the disputed 1876
election in favor of Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, Rehnquist argued that
their involvement was vindicated by the results.
Id. For an example of the construction of a jurisprudence of hyper-legalism in the area of
free expression and association under the First Amendment, see Larry Cat6 Backer,
DiscipliningJudicial Interpretationof Fundamental Rights: First Amendment Decadence in
Southworth and Boy Scouts of America and European Alternatives, 36 TULSA L.J. 117
(2000).
193. Professor Jack Balkin has suggested something similar in his discussion of the
legitimacy of the recent election in which George W. Bush secured a majority of the
electoral votes but Albert Gore secured a majority of the national popular vote.
Legitimacy, however, is a strange and wonderful thing. If we remember that elections
and procedures are not popular will itself but only one particular construction of it,
we will understand why there is still cause for hope. Elections are won by rules, but
legitimacy is produced through informal popular acceptance. Americans can easily
bestow legitimacy on the new president despite the recent shenanigans of the two
major political parties. If people make clear that they accept the new government, it
will have all the legitimacy it needs.
Jack M. Balkin, The 'Will of the People' Is a Legal and Political Fiction, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
11, 2000, at B7.
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This is the means by which race, the

Presidential race and the Republic have managed to weave new
fabrications.

In the name of tradition, the cause of parliamentary

supremacy and discretionary federalism may move closer to dominance
in this century, benefitting all of the political factions. A highly
centralized nation is ultimately easier to control and provides a more
powerful vehicle for the recasting of the normative values of American
political society9" This American Republic would not be recognizable to
James Madison or Alexander Hamilton. The institutional forms would
appear unchanged, but their substance would be foreign to them. At the
end of this coming series of changes, our Republic, tied as strongly as
ever to tradition, will be recognizable to the generations that came

before it in name only.

194. Perhaps this is an inevitable precursor to this century's coming battles over
control of worldwide trade and migration. Consolidation, harmonization, integration and
assimilation appear to be the order of the twenty-first century. Indeed, technology has
made it possible to overcome the nation-state as the best site, or the largest efficient space,
for communal norm-making. Into the void created by the tugging conflict between the
local and the general, the notions of concurrent majorities, nullification, a layering of
communities with overlapping powers, sui generis constructions of governance which do
not play by the rules, which were categorically rejected in the age of the great nation-state
empires and in the United States after 1865, may well be relevant once again. In the
regime of growing world-wide migration, emerging ethnic communities, and world wide
systems of norm-making in which governance systems become malleable, federalism
principles rejected in the great age of the nation-state may well serve as more effective
mediating axioms than those designed for the seventeenth century European world. Larry
CatA Backer, The Extra-National State: American Confederate Federalism and the
European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 173 (2001).
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